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ARTICLES
The Economic Torts and English Law:
An Uncertain Future
Hazel Carty'
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Economic Torts Outlined
There is no over-arching tort of unfair competition or misappropriation in
English common law. Rather, when excessive competitive practices are al-
leged, the aggrieved party must identify a specific tort (or torts) that cover
the harm done to them. The causes of action most appropriate where unfair
trading is the issue are the so-called "economic torts."' These causes of
action comprise the torts of simple conspiracy, unlawful conspiracy, induc-
ing breach of contract, intimidation, unlawful interference with trade, and
malicious falsehoodA The list also includes the important tort of passing off
which, unlike the others, is not a tort of intention. The prime reason for the
existence of these torts is the protection of economic interests, particularly
in a three-party setting, for as Weir cleverly remarks: "while you can take
direct action against a person's body or property... to ruin a person finan-
cially the action you must take must be indirect, through another person,
the source of his earnings or profits."'4 This Article aims to present the Eng-
I Reader in Law, Manchester University Law School.
2 Given that the protection of economic interests (by which is meant existing wealth or
financial expectations) is the prime reason for their existence.
3 The tort of deceit could also be added to this list. Originally an action linked to the
early development of contract law as it related to breach of warranty, the action was clearly
separated from contract law in the case of Pasley v. Freeman, (1789) 3 TR 51. As Allen notes,
"It]he extension of liability for deceit to a non-contractual situation, in which the defendant did
not benefit from the fraud, was novel, and, in founding liability upon the knowledge of falsity,
the case laid the basis for the modern law of deceit." See DAVID K. ALLEN, MISREPRESENTATION
39 (1988). However, it is of limited value as an economic tort. As will be seen, the real strength
of the economic torts is that they work in a three-party setting; deceit is primarily a tort that
applies in a two-party setting. Heydon notes, "it is of little use to the competitor of the liar; he
has not acted to his detriment on a false statement, but rather has been injured because others
acted upon it" J.D. HEYDON, ECONOMIC TORTS 87 (2d ed. 1978). The tort is overshadowed by
the possibility of liability for negligent misstatement.
4 TONY WEIR, A CASEBOOK ON TORT 572 (ioth ed. 2004).
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lish common law on the economic torts and analyse the uncertainties and
tension within their development.
For the sake of easier exposition these torts can be divided into those
economic torts that require a misrepresentation'-namely, passing off
and malicious falsehood-and those that do not, which I have termed the
"general" economic torts. Some commentators have distinguished the two
categories by observing that in the misrepresentation torts the defendant
seeks to make a profit that "properly" belongs to the claimant,6 while in the
general economic torts the defendant seeks to attack the claimant. Cer-
tainly the misrepresentation economic torts seem to be more appropriate
for "unfair competition" type claims, while the general economic torts (as
we shall see) were commonly used against the emerging trade unions-and
that fact has distorted their development.
Yet a caveat must be entered into this neat division; there are important
interconnections between the general and misrepresentation economic
torts. The general economic torts can indeed be significant in a "misappro-
priation" grievance, as three important general economic tort cases which
were appealed from the Court of Appeal to the House of Lords in late
2006 bear witness. In Douglas v. Hello!, Ltd.,7 unlawful interference with
trade was alleged, in what was essentially a dispute between rival celebrity
magazines over the publication of unauthorised photographs of a celebrity
event (the claimant magazine having "exclusive" photographic rights over
that event). In Mainstream Properties v. Young,s the claimant used the tort
of inducing breach of contract to attack the defendant for financing the
exploitation by the claimant's employees of a business opportunity that
"belonged" to the claimant. Finally, in OBG, Ltd. v. Allan,9 the claimant
company sought to use the hybrid tort of interference with contractual re-
lations to object to the handling of the company's assets by the defendant
receivers. As will be seen, these three cases encapsulate the uncertainty
and "mess" of the general economic torts. The House of Lords had the
opportunity in 2007 to resolve the key issues present in the area of general
economic torts, while simultaneously setting their modern agenda.
5 The common law has not imposed liability for harmful representations that are truthful
but developments towards privacy protection may see a change in this attitude.
6 See, e.g., J.D. Heydon, The Future of the Economic Torts, 12 W. AUSTL. L. REv. 1( 975).
7 Douglas v. Hello!, Ltd., [2005] EWCA (Civ) 595, 2005 762 Q.B. 125 (CA(Civ. Div.)).
8 Mainstream Properties v. Young, [20051 EWCA (Civ) 861 (CA(Civ. Div.), 2005 I.R.L.R.
964-
9 OBG, Ltd. v. Allan, [2oo5] EWCA (Civ) 1o6, 2005 2 W.L.R. 1174.
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B. Abstentionism v. Interventionism
Overall, the best approach to understanding all the economic torts, as well
as rationalising their development, is to view them as protecting against
the infliction of economic harm against a background of competition. This
is because they all set limits on the defendant's commercial behaviour. In-
deed, competitive activity is involved even in cases involving trade union
activity and industrial action in the sense that "the aim of the action is to
achieve a redistribution of wealth from the employer to the employees, just
as traders seek to divert wealth from their competitors to themselves."' 0
That being so, the development of the economic torts in English common
law must be understood by reference to the following inter-dependent fac-
tors.
First, English tort law on the whole does not have as its primary func-
tion the protection of economic interests. Though torts often indirectly of-
fer such protection, tort law focuses on the protection of physical integrity,
property rights and enjoyment and reputation. Lord Oliver in Murphy v.
Brentwood DC I noted "[tihe infliction of physical injury to the person or
property of another universally requires to be justified. The causing of eco-
nomic loss does not."'" In English common law this is particularly high-
lighted in the tort of negligence, but does also colour the approach to li-
ability for the intentional infliction of economic loss.
Second, traditionally the common law has not been seen by the judicia-
ry as a legitimate way of controlling aspects of the economy. Letwin notes
that this applied both to any assumption of an anti-trust function 3 as much
as to the curbing of aggressive competition. 4 There are indeed famous ju-
dicial dicta which underline the unwillingness to shape economic policy.
Lord Davey, for example, asserted in 1902 that "[p]ublic policy is always
an unsafe and treacherous ground for legal decision,"'" while Lord Fry (in
10 PETER CANE, TORT LAW AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS 472 n.72 (2d ed, 1996). Indeed, in
Allen v. Flood, a key trade dispute claim, Lord Shand noted that the issue before the court was
"one of competition in labour, which ... is in all essentials analogous to competition in trade,
and to which the same principles must apply." Allen v. Flood, [1898] A.C. I, 164.
11 Murphy v. Brentwood DC, (1991) i A.C. 398.
12 Id. at 487.
13 This trend is particularly apparent in relation to the restraint of trade doctrine where
the courts accepted the notion of a reasonable restraint. See, e.g., Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and
Ammunition Co. v. Nordenfelt, (1893) 1 Ch. 63o, 673. In MogulSteamship Co. v. Mcdregor, Gow
& Co., (1889) 23 Q.B.D. 598, 615, 625-26, the House of Lords, in an action brought against a
cartel, refused to distinguish between fair and unfair competition.
14 See generally William L. Letwin, The English Common Law Concerning Monopolies, 21 U.
CHI. L. REv. 355 (1954) C
15 Janson v. Driefontein Consolidated Mines, (1902) A.C. 484, 500 .
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1889) asserted that "[t]o draw a line between fair and unfair competition..
* passes the power of the courts."
16
Third, the common law does not favour acceptance of either "gener-
alised" rights or a general theory of tort liability. The traditional mistrust
of such rights ties in with the structural features of the common law in-
volving a cautious case-by-case approach, based on the doctrine of prec-
edent. 17 Thus the natural tendency of the common law is to develop slowly
by analogy. Smith and Burns note "in regard to the nominate torts [i.e., as
distinguished from the tort of negligence], the advantages of the simplicity
achievable by working under a single general principle would be far out-
weighed by the complexity and variety of exceptions that would be neces-
sary to accommodate the various relevant policy considerations at stake."' 8
The factors outlined above explain the "abstentionist" approach of
English common law to liability in the area of competing activity. Eng-
lish tort law does not acknowledge a tort of intentionally causing economic
harm, and there is no unfair competition action. The abstentionist policy
was dominant in the Victorian decision of the House of Lords in Allen v
Flood (discussed below), setting the agenda (in theory) for the develop-
ment of the general economic torts. However, even in the tort of passing
off, which lacks many of the limiting characteristics of the other economic
torts, most notably because it is a tort of strict liability rather than inten-
tion, the "abstentionist" trend of the common law where economic activity
regulation is concerned is apparent. Thus, in theory there are parameters
set to this tort which limit it to the regulation of certain material misrepre-
sentations.
However, the abstentionist approach has not been consistently applied
where the general economic torts are concerned. Over the years, begin-
ning in the Victorian era but extending into the latter part of the twentieth
century, some judges adopted a more interventionist strategy in situations
involving commercial bodies using these torts against trade unions rather
I6 Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow, & Co., (1889) 28 Q.B.D. 598, 625-26.
17 Most recently this tendency has been apparent in the reaction of the appellate courts
to pressure by claimants to develop an action for privacy, free-standing from the action for
breach of confidence. See, e.g., Douglas v. Hello!, Ltd., [20051 EWCA (Civ) 595, 2005 762
Q.B. 125 (CA(Civ. Div.)). So far, the courts have been cautious, developing aspects of privacy
protection within the action for breach of confidence rather than creating a "blockbusting"
privacy tort. See Campbell v. Mirror Group Newspapers , (2oo4 ) 2 A.C. 457. However, it may
be that the common law will be pushed into a privacy tort by the application of Article 8 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, as applied by the European Court of Human Rights.
See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8.
18 J.C. Smith & Peter Burns, Donoghue v. Stevenson -The Not So Golden Anniversary,
46 MOD. L. REV. 147, 149 (1983). There are commentators, however, who are critical of this
mindset. See, e.g., Philip Sales & Daniel Stilitz, Intentional Infliction of Harm by Unlawful
Means,i 15 L.Q.R. 411, 436 (1999) (authors argue there is "scope for development of general
principles of liability in respect of harm inflicted intentionally").
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than trade rivals. So, the development of these torts has become linked to
the influential decisions of some members of the judiciary, hostile to the
trade unions either as bodies in themselves (in the Victorian period) or as
powerful organisations wielding "uncontrolled power" (for part of the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century). Where judicial hostility was present 19 an
"interventionist" approach determined the outcome of the cases. Though
the interventionist approach may have been stimulated by judicial con-
cerns over trade union activities, the resultant inconsistent and uncertain
scope of these torts is also present in their application in contexts other
than the industrial action sphere. Thus, even where these torts are pleaded
in strictly commercial or competition cases the interventionist "baggage"
remains. As a result, the development of the general economic torts has
been muddied, with such key issues as the intention required in the torts,
the nature of the "unlawful means" required, and the relationship of the
torts to each other all still a matter for debate in the three key cases which
went on appeal to the House of Lords in 2006.20
But what of the misrepresentation economic torts? They typically apply
in a trade competition setting so that all the above factors (and the absence
of a trade union dimension) should have led the courts to develop defi-
nite parameters for these torts, taking into account the public interest in
supporting even aggressive competition. This has certainly been the case
with the tort of malicious falsehood, a tort that normally applies in cases of
false trade disparagement.2' Victorian litigation of this tort indicated the
sympathy of the House of Lords with defendants in their endeavours in
the "hard world of competition for customers" leading to the "scrupulous
limitation of liability for mis-statements22 and for unfair advertising prac-
tices." 3 Moreover, the courts made it clear that they did not want to be
dragged too far into the competitive process. In 1895, therefore, liability
for untrue self-commendation was rejected by the highest court as this
would lead to the tort of malicious falsehood being used by claimants to
employing the courts "in trying the relative merits of rival productions." 4
19 Seegenerally Quinn,,. Leathem [19oI] A.C. 495; Torquay Hotel Co. v. Cousins, (1968)
2 Ch. 1o6.
20 Seesupra notes 7-9 and accompanying text. Douglas involves, inter alia, a dispute as to
the nature of the intention required for the tort of unlawful interference with trade;Mainstream
Properties centres on the intention and knowledge required for the tort of inducing breach of
contract; OBG highlights the messy interface between the torts of unlawful interference with
trade and inducing breach of contract. These are all discussed in greater detail below in the
text.
21 In fact, as the text below indicates, the tort covers a wider field than that, but the need
to show "malice" limits the usefulness of this tort.
22 So the same abstentionist approach can be seen in the tort of deceit.
23 W.R. CORNISH & G. DE N. CLARK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN ENGLAND 1750-1950 329 n.41
(1989) (citing Derry v. Peek (1889) 14 App. Cas. 337; White v. Mellin [1895] A.C. 154).
24 White v. Mellin, [1895] A.C. 154, 164 (Lord Herschell).
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However, the tort of passing off has attracted interventionist/expansionist
sympathies. In the quest for more protection in competition claimants are
increasingly attempting to extend the reach of this tort-in recent years
this has particularly been the case where "image rights" are in issue (there
being no publicity right as such in English common law) and unfair inter-
net or electronic practices are involved (such as cyber-squatting or phish-
ing). Though the reaction of the courts is still unpredictable, some judges
have stressed that this is a cause of action still evolving "to meet changes in
methods of trade and communication""5 and indeed it has on occasion been
referred to as a tort of unfair competition.
It is hard not to believe that this is a key era in the development of this
tort. Thus, the time is ripe for an assessment of the current English law
on the economic torts and predictions for the future. What will be argued
below is that the historical baggage should be viewed with caution and the
courts required to formulate a clear liability with a clear rationale. A rigor-
ous analysis of the economic torts is required, and the three appeals to the
House of Lords provide the opportunity to start this process, at least where
the general economic torts are concerned.
II. THE GENERAL ECONOMIC TORTS
A. The Importance of Allen v. Flood
The general economic torts are the torts of conspiracy (simple and unlaw-
ful), inducing breach of contract, intimidation and the "genus" tort of un-
lawful interference with trade. Most of these torts have their origins in early
common law development. Unlawful conspiracy can be traced back to the
writ of conspiracy in the reign of Edward I, the tort of inducing breach of
contract arose from the action for enticement of a servant contained in the
Statute of Labourers of 1349, and the tort of intimidation (in theory) dates
from cases in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.2 6 However their
real development took place in the late Victorian era and early twentieth
century. The agenda for these torts in the modern era should have been
finally set by the important House of Lords decision in Allen v. Flood 7 but,
as is revealed in the 2006 House of Lords' cases, 8 uncertainty has dogged
their application even into the twenty-first century.
25 British Telecommunications Plc. v. One in a Million, [i999] ES.R. I, 12 (Lord Justice
Aldous).
26 See, e.g., Garret v. Taylor (1620) Cro Jac 567; Tarleton v. M'Gawley, 0793) Peake NP
270 (in both cases violence was threatened to plaintiff's customers)
27 Allen v. Flood, [1898] A.C. i.
z8 See supra notes 7-9.
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In 1853 the modern development of the general economic torts began
in English law. In that year Lumley v. Gye 9 recognised the tort of inducing
breach of contract. There, a singer who had an exclusive performing con-
tract with the plaintiff30 was persuaded by the defendant to break this con-
tract and perform for him instead. Though the common law had protected
interference with the master-servant relationship since medieval times,31
this decision "freed the old enticement action from its roots in status rela-
tions. ' 3 However it took some thirty years for it to become established that
the tort applied to all contracts and not just contracts of service. Indeed,
even some forty years later, uncertainty as to what principle it formulated33
meant that Lord Esher in Temperton v. Russell 34 was unable to see the dis-
tinction between inducing breach of contract and inducing people not to
deal with the plaintiff.35 This uncertainty developed out of a variety of con-
cerns, as there was judicial hostility to the perceived erosion of the privity
principle, and a conflict between those judges who preferred firm rules in
the development of economic tort liability and those who were happy to
focus on a subjective notion of "malice," a tendency still apparent in some
of the judgments in Lumley v. Gye.36 But in this era there was also conflict
within the judiciary as to the correct level of judicial control over trade
competition and, more controversially, of trade union power and collective
pressure. In essence, the judges needed to decide between an abstention-
ist or interventionist role for the common law in the area of intentionally
inflicted economic harm. In 1898 the chance to make this choice once and
for all arose in Allen v. Flood.
29 Lumleyv. Gye, (1853) 2 EL. & BL. 216, 216.
30 In recent years the term "plaintiff" has been replaced by the term "claimant" in
English civil litigation, hence the date of the litigation described determines which of these
two terms is used in the discussion.
31 There were torts of abducting a servant and harbouring a servant. Parliament indeed
intervened in 1349 in the Statute of Labourers to deal with the problem of labour shortage
following the Black Death. David Partlett notes that Lumley v. Gye was "an equally well-
suited solution to the farm labor shortage that troubled the American South during the
Reconstruction." David F. Partlett, From Victorian Operas to Rock and Rap: Inducement to Breach
of Contract in the Music Industry, 66TuL. L. REv. 771, 784-85 0992).
32 John Danforth, Tortious Interference with Contract: A Reassertion of Society's Interest in
Commercial Stability and Contractual Integrity, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1491, 1495 (1981).
33 For a review of this process see Charles E. Carpenter, Interference with Contractual
Relations, 41 HAR v. L. REv. 728, 730-32 (1928).
34 Temperton v. Russell, (1893) 1 Q.B. 715.
35 Id. at 728. Though this distinction was reaffirmed in Allen v. Flood, [898] A.C. 1, 21,
Temperron had a profound effect on the development of the tort in America, leading to the
protection of commercial expectations generally.
36 Malice appeared to be an important issue in the judgments in Lumley v. Gye, (1853) EL.
& BL. 216, 216-3o, and subsequently in Bowen v. Hall(1881) 6 Q.B.D. 333-which stressed
that malicious interference was the basis of the tort. See Bowen, (1881) 6 Q.B.D., at 338.
2oo6-2oo7]
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In Allen v. Flood the defendant was a trade union official who informed
an employer that his workers would cease to work (though not in breach
of contract) unless the plaintiffs were dismissed.37 The dismissal (as with
the cessation of work) would be lawful.38 There was no factual evidence of
conspiracy, intimidation, or breach of contract. 9 No unlawful acts as such
were involved, but the defendant was motivated by malice. 40 The aim of
the action was to punish the plaintiffs for previous "misconduct" in relation
to a demarcation dispute. 4' Thus, the central policy issue for the House of
Lords to determine was whether, in the absence of unlawful means, Eng-
lish common law should impose economic tort liability simply on the pres-
ence of malice and intentional harm.
42
The decision could have gone either way. For the interventionist judge,
intentional injury causing economic loss should be actionable unless public
policy (by means of a defence of justification) ruled otherwise. This was
clearly a possible way forward for the House of Lords in Allen. Some three
years earlier, Lord Field agreed wholeheartedly with the interventionist
view in Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor,43 as indeed had the Court of Ap-
peal in Allen. Centering on the "right to trade," 44 the court held the de-
fendant liable on the basis that they had "maliciously procured the lawful
dismissal of the plaintiff."4 Furthermore, even within the House of Lords
in Allen, Lords Halsbury and Morris 46 favoured this refined interventionist
argument. Indeed, all of the judges who had been called on to advise the
House of Lords were in favour of the proposition that "every man has a
right to pursue his trade or calling without molestation or obstruction and
that anyone who by any act, though it be not otherwise unlawful, molest or
obstruct him is guilty of a wrong unless he can show lawful justification or
excuse for so doing," influenced by early cases that indicated wide liability
for competitive practices. For example, dicta can be found in the 1707 case
37 Allen v. Flood, [1898] A.C. i, I.
38 Id. at 2.
39 Id. at 3.
40 Id. at 2.
41 Id. at 12
42 Id. at i.
43 Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, [1892] A.C. 25, 51-2.
44 Indeed the absolute interventionist argument was unlikely to hold sway. Decisions
such as Bradford v. Pickles, [1895] A.C. 587 and Stevenson v. Newnham, 13 CB 285 ("An act
which does not amount to a legal injury cannot be actionable because it is done with a bad
motive," Parke B) indicated that there was no such general common law doctrine.
45 MogulSteamship Co., [1892] A.C. 25, at 52.
46 Indeed, he asserted that the overwhelming judicial opinion of England concurred
with it.
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of Keeble v. HickeringilJP7 that "he that hinders another in his trade or liveli-
hood is liable to an action for so hindering him.""
However, the majority of the House of Lords decided in favour of an
abstentionist approach for economic tort liability. Keeble v. Hickeringill was
held to be of doubtful authority, with the cases referred to in that decision
in fact involving the use of unlawful means or conspiracy to injure. The no-
tion of the "right to trade" was rejected, while for the majority of the House,
motive of itself was not a permissible mechanism for imposing economic
tort liability. Lord Watson observed that the law of England does not take
into account motive as constituting an element of civil wrong; the existence
of a bad motive, in the case of an act which is not of itself illegal, will not
convert that act into a civil wrong.49 After Allen v. Flood, therefore, a general
tort of unjustifiable interference with trade was untenable. To allege inten-
tional economic harm, even where "malice" was present, would not suffice.
No notion of prima facie tort liability was to be accepted. 0 Where trade was
intentionally harmed, the added ingredient would be intrinsic unlawful-
ness or violation of a legal (and absolute) right. Essentially, the key ingredi-
ent for liability would be the presence of unlawful means, used against the
claimant (either by the defendant or through a third party)."' The court ac-
cepted that there was a "chasm" between intentional harm done by lawful
means and harm resulting from a legal right being violated.
This policy was in keeping with the emergence of the tort of induc-
ing breach of contract and the existence of the tort of unlawful conspiracy.
Though the tort of unlawful conspiracy appeared to have been around
since the development of the action on the case, as an economic tort it adds
little to the arsenal of the claimant because it requires an unlawful act-in
essence another tort-to be involved. In fact the tort is largely unneces-
sary: the claimant can rest liability on the unlawful act itself and attack
those who "conspire" in that unlawfulness by using the doctrine of joint
tortfeasance.52 By this doctrine, where primary liability results from a tort,
47 Keeble v. Hickeringill, (1809) I i East 574.
48 Id. at 575.
49 Allen v. Flood, [898] A.C. I, io6-07.
50 Much to Heydon's regret-his view is that Allen v. Flood denied the economic torts
theoretical consistency by rejecting malice as the focus of liability. SeeJ.D. HEYDON, ECONOMIC
TORTs (znd ed. 1978).
51 See TONY WEIR, A CASEBOOK ON TORT (ioth ed. 2004). Allen v. Flood holds that
"whatever morality may say, in law one is free to beggar one's neighbour provided one neither
does anything unlawful oneself nor gets anyone else to do anything unlawful." Id. at 6o4
(author's note).
52 So, though in Douglas v. Hello!(no6) both unlawful interference with trade and unlawful
conspiracy were originally pleaded (as indeed was simple conspiracy), the latter tort was not
discussed in detail, as it would essentially involve the same two ingredients of intentional
harm and unlawful means, defined in the same way.
2006-2007]
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those liable through their secondary involvement become principals in the
commission of the tortious act.
The abstentionist policy did not, however, gain support from all mem-
bers of the House of Lords; there were dissenting judgments. Furthermore,
even the majority opinions in Allen v. Flood reveal uncertainty about the
implications of this decision. While Lord Watson underlines the need for
unlawfulness to create economic tort liability, Lords Herschell, Shand, and
Davey simply reject "malice" as a basis of common law liability; they do
not even go so far as to give Lumley v. Gye wholehearted support. This re-
sulted in an open door for interventionist members of the House of Lords
to reject the true implications of Allen v. Flood in the subsequent case of
Quinn v. Leathem.53
B. Uncertainty in the Development after Allen v Flood
Quinn v. Leathem was a case with similar facts to Allen v. Flood, distinguished
on the basis that there was a combination. The case was a dispute between
the defendant trade union officials and the plaintiff who employed non-
union labour. As part of this dispute the defendants approached the main
customer of the plaintiff and threatened that the customer's workers would
leave his employ (lawfully) unless he ceased trading with the plaintiff (law-
fully). The additional factor of combination allowed the House of Lords to
impose liability, even though no unlawful means or unlawful result were
involved. The justification for this was the oppressive nature of conspira-
cies. Lord Lindley noted in Quinn that "numbers may annoy or coerce
where one may not."' This case nurtured the economic tort of "simple
conspiracy," where the "magic of plurality" renders a combination to injure
tortious, despite the lack of unlawful means. This anomalous tort, which
can render combined action tortious where the act of a single defendant
would be lawful, is subject to a defence of justification, which includes self-
interest. As such, then, this tort will only cover combined action that causes
economic harm out of spite and will rarely be of practical use.55
As an anomalous economic tort, at variance with the policy of Allen v.
Flood, simple conspiracy offers no clues as to the true potential of the other
economic torts. However, its existence reveals the tension within the com-
mon law and a clear deviation (within three years) from the abstentionist
path set out in Allen. Its existence was due to the legalisation of the trade
unions in 1871-1875. By the Trade Union Act of 1871, the purposes of trade
unions were no longer automatically criminal conspiracies, simply because
53 SeeQuinn v. Leathem, [19o] AC 495.
54 Id. at 538.
55 Lord Diplock commented that it has attracted more academic controversy than
success in its practical application and, given it makes motive the key factor in liability, it
cannot be squared with the basic rule contained in Allen v. Flood.
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they were in restraint of trade, while the Conspiracy and Protection of
Property Act 1875 provided that agreements in contemplation or further-
ance of a trade dispute were notperse criminal conspiracies. 6 However, just
as Parliament withdrew the threat of the criminal law to the emerging trade
unions, the courts developed the civil law threat of simple conspiracy.
This development denied a smooth transition into an abstentionist
foundation for the economic torts.5 7 The result was an economic tort ("a
modern invention altogether" according to Lord Denning 5 ) that posed
particular problems for trade unions, ran counter to the policy of Allen v.
Flood, and left the basis of general economic tort liability in a state of con-
tradiction and uncertainty. So in 1903, in the case of Giblan v NALUGBI s9
the Court of Appeal was still debating whether there was a possible tort of
violation of a right to trade, and even as late as 1964 in Rookes v. Barnard,
Lord Devlin noted that it was not necessary for the House of Lords to de-
cide "whether or not malicious interference by a single person with trade,
business or employment is or is not a tort known to the law."6 As for Lumley
v. Gye, though decided in the middle of the nineteenth century, it was still
being described in 192361 as an "ing6nue" in the law.
This uncertainty surrounding the scope of the Lumley v. Gye tort and
the precise reach of the policy in Allen v. Flood allowed other varieties of
economic tort to flourish, often as a means of preventing "aggressive" trade
union pressure. So, having accepted the tort of inducing breach of contract,
species of that tort developed. The most cited summary of these varieties
is contained in the judgment of Lord Justice Jenkins in D.C. Thomson &Co.
,Ltd. v. Deakin.61 This case identified two other species of the tort, in addi-
tion to the established form of the tort, direct persuasion to contact breach
applied by the defendant to the contact breaker (as was the case in Lumley
v. Gye itself).63 These were direct intervention in the contract by an unlaw-
56 For example, if they only involved acts which if committed by one alone would not
involve crime.
57 The court in MogulSteamship v. McGregor, Gow &Co.,(1889) L.R. 23 Q.B.D. 598, had
applied this tort when deciding on the lawfulness of the activities of an aggressive cartel
which sought to rid itself of competition from the plaintiff. However, trade competition was
held always to be justifiable in such circumstances.
58 Midland Bank Trust Co. v. Green, (No. 3) (1982) 1 Ch. 529, 539.
59 See Giblan v. Nat'l Amalgamated Labourers' Union of Gr. Brit. and Ir., [1903] K.B. 600
(Court of Appeal).
60 Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1 129, 1215.
61 See Francis Bowes Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 H~Av. L. REv. 663, 671 (1923).
62 See D.C. Thompson & Co. v. Deakin, [1952] Ch. 646,649 (Court of Appeal).
63 Lumley v. Gye, (1953) 2 E & E 216; Lord Justice Jenkins suggested a further species
of the tort-that of "inconsistent dealings." He stated: "if a third party, with knowledge of a
contract between the contract breaker and another, has dealings with the contract breaker
which the third party knows to be inconsistent with the contract, he has committed an
actionable interference." Id. He drew support from the earlier decision in British Motor Trade
2oo6-2oo7]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
ful act' (for example by using trespass to goods to prevent a contact from
being performed)65 and indirect intervention in the contract by means of
an unlawful act (often on the facts of leading cases, this would be second-
ary industrial action where the claimants' commercial partners would be
targeted through their workforce). For indirect breach liability, the ultimate
breach must be a necessary consequence of the unlawful act, rather than a
mere consequence. These extensions have attracted controversy, refocus-
ing the tort on interference rather than persuasion/inducement and fail-
ing to note the presence of an unlawful act at the heart of these so-called
"varieties." But that did not prevent Lord Denning suggesting a further
extension in Torquay Hotel Co. Ltd. v. Cousins,66 where he concluded that the
tort of inducing breach could extend to deliberately preventing or hindering
one party from performing the contract. 67 This tort-unlawful interference
with contract performance-was approved by Lord Diplock in Merkur Is-
land Shipping Corp. v. Laughton.68 Thus, although the Lumley v. Gye tort was
established in 1853, judicial confusion stemming from its varieties led Lord
Justice Ralph Gibson to refer to it in Millarv. Bassey69 as a "comparatively
new tort of which the precise boundaries should be established from case
to case."'
7
0
The modern economic tort of intimidation was created in 1964, again
as a direct response to "aggressive" trade union pressure. This had been
an obscure tort, presumed to be limited to threats of physical harm which
Ass'n v. Salvadori, [1949] Ch 556 where the defendant bought a car from the plaintiff's co-
contractor knowing that this sale constituted a breach by the co-contractor of his obligation
not to sell the car for a year. Though on the facts this could be seen as a standard inducement
case (the high price offered for the car being the inducement), subsequent case law seems
to have assumed that this case supports an "inconsistent transaction" tort. See also Rickless v.
United Artists Corp., [1987] ES.R. 362 (opinion of Bingham, L.J.). The view of this writer is
that no such variety of the tort exists; for the direct form of the tort, direct participation should
be required.
64 In fact, in the case Lord Justice and Lord Evershed M.R. appear to adopt different
views on this point. See supra note 63.
65 See G.W.K. v. Dunlop [1926] 42 TL.R. 376. Here, a car manufacturer had contracted
with the plaintiffs to display the plaintiffs' tyres on their cars, when they were exhibited at
a motor show. The defendants were held liable when they removed the plaintiffs' tyres (a
trespass to the manufacturer's goods) and replaced them with their own.
66 Torquay Hotel Co. v. Cousins, [1969] 2 Ch. io6, 140-41 (Court of Appeal) (part of Lord
Denning's general attack on the use by trade unions of industrial power).
67 Id. at 138. In the case itself, the claimant's contract was deliberately, though indirectly,
targeted by the defendant, but no actionable breach of the claimant's contract resulted due to
the presence of an exclusion clause excluding liability for the relevant breach.
68 See Merkur Island Shipping Corp. v. Laughton, (1983) 2 AC 570, 578 (another claim
based on an indirect attack by the defendant (using another's workforce) on the claimant's
contract, where aforce majeure clause meant that no actionable breach of the claimant's contract
resulted from the defendant's actions).
69 Millar v. Bassey, [1994] E.M.L.R. 44.
70 Id. at 72.
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caused economic harm. So, in Garret v. Taylor,71 the plaintiff was held to
have a cause of action against the defendant who threatened violence
against the plaintiff's customers. However, in Rookes v. Barnard, the House
of Lords in a revolutionary decision held that a threat to break a contract was
sufficient unlawful means for liability. Lord Reid held that "threatening a
breach of contract may be a much more coercive weapon than threatening
a tort. '"72 This meant that in the case itself the defendants (including a trade
union official) were liable for the tort of intimidation when they threatened
the employer with breaches of their contracts of employment unless he
agreed to terminate the plaintiff's contract (by lawful means). By alleging
the tort of intimidation (not thought at the time to be a significant eco-
nomic tort) the plaintiff circumvented the then-extensive statutory immu-
nity from specific economic torts for those engaged in trade disputes. The
court acknowledged that this economic tort, therefore, arose in its modern
form "out of the circumstances of modern industrial relations."" Indeed,
the Court of Appeal had rejected this version of the tort, unhappy to create
a tort that would be central to the lawfulness or otherwise of trade disputes,
driving as it did a "coach and four"74 through the then statutory immunities
and rendering statutory protection against liability largely illusory.7"
C. The Emergence of a Genus Economic Tort
What such developments did, however, was to mask the important fact that
a genus economic tort had emerged, a tort which had a radically different
structure to that of the classic tort of inducing breach of contract. That ge-
nus tort-unlawful interference with trade-was expressly acknowledged
by the House of Lords in 1983.76 There were modern indications of its
existence in 1960s," championed by Lord Denning when he seemed ea-
71 Garrett v. Taylor, [1620] Cro. Jac. 567, 567.
72 See Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129 (the House of Lords however made it clear
that this form of the tort of intimidation-where a breach of contract was the unlawful means
-would only apply in a three-party setting. To threaten to break your own contract in order
to harm the claimant, your co-contractor, would not be tortious, though it might give rise to
contractual or restitutionary remedies).
73 Id. at 1185 (Lord Evershed).
74 Id. at 5157.
75 In fact, Parliament reacted by granting immunity from this "new" economic tort
in the Trade Disputes Act of 1965. Since the legalisation of the trade unions this had been
the leitmotif of the law's development in this area. Parliament would provide legality for
the unions and their activities and the courts would try to circumvent this by creating new
economic torts. However, this pattern was ruptured by the Thatcher administration in its
quest for decollectivisation; strict rules were placed on the taking of industrial action.
76 See Merkur Island Shipping Corp. v. Laughton, (1983) 2 A.C. 570, 578. Lord Diplock
referred to it as the "genus" economic tort, the other economic tort being but species of this
tort. Id. at 571-72.
77 Lord Reid in both Rookes and Stratford&Son v. Lindley, [1965] AC 269, 318 indicated
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ger to extend economic tort liability generally as part of his crusade in the
1960s and 1970s to protect the little man against the battalions of the trade
unions. He made reference to it in Daily Mirror Newspapers, Ltd. v. Gard-
ner"' and then forcefully argued for its existence in Torquay Hotel v. Cous-
ins,79 asserting "I have always understood that if one person deliberately
interferes with the trade or business of another, and does so by unlawful
means . .. then he is acting unlawfully . . . ."0 However, there are in fact
indications of its existence in much earlier cases.8" Indeed, in Allen v. Flood,
Lord Watson came close to a general formulation of a tort of unlawful and
intentional harm.
However, the uncertainties surrounding the economic torts generally
led, as has been seen, to specific torts being developed at the expense of
overall coherence. When the tort of intimidation is analysed it is seen to
have as its essence the use of unlawful means, though the ingredient of
threats gives the tort its name."' As Lord Reid noted in Rookes, "[s]o long
as the defendant only threatens to do what he has a legal right to do he
is on safe ground. '8 3 However, the House of Lords in Rookes rejected the
arguments of appellants' counsel that a genus tort should be recognised, 8
preferring to create another specific economic tort. Thus the coherent de-
velopment of unlawful interference with trade and the exploration of its re-
lationship to the tort of inducing breach of contract have been undermined
by the "baggage" of judicial hostility to trade union power that has, in part,
shaped the species economic torts. Interestingly, the acceptance of the tort
came in an era when the traditional statutory immunity that covered nearly
he believed the tort existed but it is Lord Denning's pronouncements that caught the
imagination of subsequent plaintiffs and courts.
78 Daily Mirror Newspapers, Ltd. v. Gardner, [1968] z Q.B. 762, 779.
79 Torquay Hotel Co. v. Cousins, (1969) 2 Ch. io6 (Court of Appeal).
8o Id. at 139. In the case itself the defendant deliberately caused the contract between
the supplier and the plaintiff to be "breached" but the contact itself contained a force majeure
clause so that the supplier could not be sued. The other two members of the Court of Appeal
saw this as an orthodox application of the tort of inducing breach. However Lord Denning
chose to interpret the force majeure clause as meaning there was no breach. Hence he
suggested this new tort.
81 In 1918, Justice McCardie commented, "[tihis element of combination ... has . .
tended perhaps to obscure the true basis of the rules of law which render actionable an
unlawful interference with a man's calling." Pratt v. British Med. Ass'n, (1919) I K.B. 244, 255
(the case dealt with simple conspiracy).
82 Though of course the tort of intimidation adds an important gloss to the tort of
unlawful interference with trade, threatened unlawful acts are equated to the unlawful acts
themselves.
83 Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129, 1168.
84 See id. The appellant's counsel urged the House of Lords to create a general principle
of liability based on intentional employment of unlawful means to injure the plaintiff's
business. See id.
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all forms of industrial action was severely reduced;85 trade unions were in-
creasingly being sued for economic tort liability now that their shield of
statutory protection had been shrunk.
D. The Task for the House of Lords in the Twenty-first Century:
Key Issues to be Resolved
Now that the tort of unlawful interference with trade has been acknowl-
edged and is being increasingly pleaded in its own right, the task of the
English common law is to distinguish its application from the Lumley v. Gye
tort and define its parameters (given as a genus tort it must include the torts
of unlawful conspiracy and intimidation). In sum, the key issues in English
common law that must be resolved to enable a coherent development of
the general economic torts are:
" Defining the key ingredients of the tort of unlawful interference;
* Defining the key ingredients of the tort of inducing breach of contract;
* Determining the relationship between these two causes of action.
In essence these are, as will be seen, the key issues raised in Douglas v.
Hello! (no6), Mainstream Properties v. Young, and OBG v. Allen, which all went
on appeal from the Court of Appeal to the House of Lords in late 2006.
1. Defining the key ingredients of the tort of unlawful interference with trade.-
This is not an easy task. Though acknowledged to exist in Merkur, Lord
Diplock did little more than note its existence; in 1989 the Court of Appeal
noted its "precise limits and characteristics" were "uncertain,"8 6 while one
year later the Court of Appeal in Lonrho v. Fayed described it as a compara-
tively new tort "of uncertain ambit," the precise boundaries of which have
to be established "from case to case."8 ' Indeed this tort was categorised as
a difficult "not to say obscure" branch of the law of tort, referred to by one
commentator as "embryonic."88 This is partly explained by the fact that
the majority of cases where the tort is pleaded are at an interim stage only,
a stage at which "the courts should not attempt finally to resolve difficult
questions of law."89 That said, the outline of the tort is now established. In
Barretts & Baird (Wholesale), Ltd. v. Institute of Professional Civil Servants,9°
85 This was the result of the Employment Acts of 198o and 1982, enacted during the
Thatcher administration.
86 See Associated British Ports v. Transport and General Workers' Union, [1989] I.C.R.
557, 573.
87 Lonrho v. Fayed, (199o) 2 Q.B. 479,492-93 (Neill L.J.).
88 Nicholas J. Mullany, Beaudesert'Buried, i i i L.Q.R. 583,586 (1995).
89 AssodatedBritish Ports, [1989] I.C.R. at 570 (Neill L.J.).
90 Barretts & Baird (Wholesale), Ltd. v. Inst. of Prof'l Civil Servants, [1987] I.R.L.R. 3.
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Justice Henry stated that it involved "interference with the plaintiffs' trade
or business ... [bylunlawful means .. .with the intention to injure the
plaintiffs."' In essence, the tort enables the claimant to protest against the
harm intentionally done to him where the defendant's unlawful means are
used against a third party, not directly against the claimant himself. Here,
the use by the defendant himself of unlawful means to intentionally harm
the claimant justifies the imposition of liability.
In order to allow the tort to take shape, the correct definitions of "in-
tentional harm" and "unlawful means" need to be authoritatively estab-
lished.
How, then, have the courts defined intentional harm with respect to this
tort? Motive as such is not important in this analysis. Indeed, Lord Justice
Dillon in Lonhro v. Fayeda2 rejected the view that this tort required the pre-
dominant intent of the defendant be to injure the claimant rather than fur-
ther his own advantage (as of course is the case with simple conspiracy).93
However, even with motivation discarded there remain competing views as
to the correct definition of intention for this tort. The "wide" view defines
intention as including foresight of inevitable or even probable consequenc-
es. The "narrow" view would require deliberate harm, with proof that the
defendant "targeted" the claimant (for whatever reason).
The majority view of both commentators 94 and the judiciary has been
that the narrow view is the correct one. So in Lonrho v. Fayed, Lord Justice
Dillon asserted that liability could arise where the fraud on a third party
was "aimed specifically at the plaintiff."' While in Associated British Ports v.
Transport and General Worker's Union,' Lord Justice Stuart-Smith contend-
ed that the essence of the tort of unlawful interference with trade was "de-
liberate and intended damage," 97 and Lord Justice Butler-Sloss agreed that
91 Id. at 6. There is also the need to establish harm.
92 Lonhro v. Fayed, (1990) 2 Q.B. 472, 489.
93 That said, however, some judges do slip into a discussion of motivation when
considering the defendant's intention in this tort. See, e.g., Barretts & Baird (Wholesale) v.
Inst. Of Prof'l Civil Servants, [1987] I.R.L.R. 3. In that decision, Henry, J. appears to favour a
narrow view of intention at times, "although he also, inconsistently, advocates a 'predominant
purpose' test" according to Daniel Stilitz & Philip Sales, Intentional Infliction of Harm by
Unlawfl Means, ii5 L.Q.R. 411, 437 n.72 (1999). And the problem is such imprecision is
often picked up by fellow judges, even outside the jurisdiction. See, e.g., Pinky's Pizza Ribs
Pry. v. Pinky's Seymour Pizza & Pasta Pry. SC Victoria, CA (June 30, 1999) (Justice Henry's
predominant purpose test is cited by Tadgell J.A. in this Australian case).
94 See, e.g., Tony Weir, Chaos or Cosmos: Rookes, Stratford and the Economic Torts,
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 230; Stilitz & Sales, supra note 93.
95 Lonrho v. Fayed, (990) 2 Q.B. 479, 489. It should be noted that in that case it was
conceded by the plaintiff that he must prove that the unlawful act was "in some sense directed
against him" or intended to harm him. Id.
96 Associated British Ports v. Transp. and Gen. Workers Union, (1989) 1 W.L.R. 939.
97 Id. at 966.
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the defendant's "object and intention" must be to injure.9 Again, in Indata
Equipment Supplies, Ltd. v. ACL, Ltd.," Lord Justice Otten defined the tort
as "one person using unlawful means with the object and effect of causing
damage to another."' ' Many Commonwealth decisions mirror this narrow
view.10 Cases pre-dating the acceptance of this genus tort also support a
narrow view of intention where the general economic torts are concerned.
So, Lord Watson in Allen v. Flood noted that liability would follow where
the defendant had used illegal means "directed against the plaintiff," a
phrase subsequently adopted by the Court of Appeal in National Phono-
graphic, Ltd. v. Edison-Bell.' In Quinn v. Leathem Lord Lindley referred
to liability where the plaintiff is wrongfully and intentionally "struck at
through others," while in Rookes v. Barnard Lord Devlin (referring to in-
timidation but logically applying a test that would also apply to the genus
tort) asserted "it must be proved that [the defendant's] object is to injure
[the plaintiff] .. ".."103 Given this tort (as with intimidation) will almost in-
variably occur in a three-party setting, the policy of these cases is that there
needs to be a necessary nexus between the defendant and claimant, and
that necessary nexus is intended harm. Probable consequences and even
inevitable consequences would not be sufficient.
Despite this weight of opinion, the definition of "intention" for this
tort remained unsettled. So in 1995 Lord Justice Woolf (in Lonrho v. Fayed)
favoured the wide view of intention, asserting that the plaintiff should be
compensated "if a defendant has deliberately embarked upon a course of
conduct, the probable consequence of which to the plaintiff he appreciat-
ed."' °4 Such a formulation, in addition to being incongruous with the major-
ity view, would catch a wide range of competitive activity and would prove
a major problem for those who take industrial action, given that whenever a
trade dispute employer is attacked there is an inevitable impact on custom-
ers and commercial partners of the claimant under attack. It was this view
that was relied upon by the claimants in Douglas v. Hello!.
In Douglas v. Hello!, the celebrity couple, Michael Douglas and Cath-
erine Zeta-Jones and the celebrity magazine OK! objected to the defen-
dant's publication of unauthorised photographs of the celebrity couple's
wedding reception. The appellants, OK!, were the exclusive authorised
98 Id. at 960.
99 Indata Equip. Supplies v.A.C.L., [1998] F.S.R. 248.
i oo Id. at 259.
ioi See, e.g., Van Camp Chocolates v. Aulsebrooks, [19841 1 N.Z.L.R. 354 (C.A.);
Cheticamp Fisheries Co-Operative v. Canada, [19951 139 N.S.R. 121; Copyright Agency v.
Haines, (1982) 1 N.S.W.L.R. 18z (McLelland, J.).
1o2 National Phonograph Co. v. Edison-Bell Consol. Phonograph Co., (I9O8) i Ch 335,
361.
103 Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129, 12o8.
1o4 Lonrho v. Fayed, (199o) z Q.B. 479,494.
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publisher of the celebrity couple's wedding photographs. The action was
in part based on breach of confidence, 05 given the photographs were taken
on a private occasion where there had been an express prohibition on un-
authorised photography by the celebrity couple. However, the Court of Ap-
peal found that no breach of confidence arose in relation to OK! magazine,
nor could that magazine claim the benefit of the confidence owed to the
celebrity couple (although on appeal the House of Lords overturned this,
see later in text). As a result, OK! also relied on the economic tort of unlaw-
ful interference with trade. In essence they were attempting to extend the
"unlawfulness" of the breach of confidence affecting the couple to them-
selves by relying on the tort of unlawful interference with trade.
The questioned remained: Could the appellant establish intentional
harm? The Court considered the possible definitions of the intention re-
quired for the tort. The spectrum of possible definitions ranged from in-
tention to harm as an end in itself; as necessary for some ulterior motive;
as an inevitable consequence; as a possible consequence and as reckless
indifference. 06 The court categorised the first two of these possibilities as
"targeted" or "aimed at" or "directed" harm. Unlike the other three pos-
sibilities they involve harm as a specific object rather than incidental con-
sequence.107 The trial judge found as a fact that the intention in procuring
and publishing the unauthorised photographs was not to "spoil" OK!'s ex-
clusive deal but rather not to disappoint the Hello! readership, given the
high profile nature of the event. There was no specific object to cause harm
to the claimant, having been determined as a fact by the trial judge, the
claimant asked the Court of Appeal to widen this definition of the requisite
intention, based on conflicting judicial dicta, so that possible or reckless
consequences would suffice. However, the court refused to accept this (and
also rejected "inevitable" consequences) as to so extend the mental ele-
ment in this tort would "transform the nature of this tort."
'
108
Of course the tort of unlawful interference with trade also requires an
"unlawful act." The need for "unlawful means" in the general economic
torts was the policy decision taken by the House of Lords in Allen v. Flood,
a rejection of a tort of unjustifiable interference or any prima facie tort the-
ory arising in America. The presence of unlawful means justifies the inter-
vention of the court, though the magic of this tort is that the defendant will
be liable to the claimant for these unlawful acts even though the claimant
1O5 Douglas v. Hello! (No.6), [2006] Q.B. 125. Given the misappropriation feel of this
action the economic torts may yet encompass the commercial side of the action for breach of
confidence.
io6 Id. at 175. The notion that reasonable foresight was sufficient was dismissed.
107 Id. Though the perceived likelihood of harm could provide evidence that the harm
was indeed targeted.
io8 Id. at 195. However, the court did accept that knowledge of inevitable harm could be
evidence of targeted harm.
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is not the direct victim of the wrong effected by the defendant. As Bagshaw
notes, the tort of unlawful interference "is parasitic on means that are de-
fined as unlawful otherwise than because they amount to torts to the plain-
tiff."'" Intentional harm may provide the link between the defendant's
acts and the claimant's harm, but the presence of the defendant's unlawful
means justifies the intervention of the common law.
But what constitutes "unlawful means"? Despite this being a key con-
cept in the tort the matter is unresolved, with the definition of this concept
largely passed over in case law with little analysis. As with the concept
of "intentional harm" there are two schools of thought. One school (and
this writer falls into this category) would demand that the unlawful means
which justify the imposition of tort liability in favour of the claimant be
independently unlawful activities in civil law in their own right. There is a
second school of thought that would see a much vaguer test; under the test
a means "the defendant is not at liberty to commit" would be sufficient. °
As the court in Douglas v. Hello! (no6) held that the requisite intention was
missing on the facts, no in-depth analysis was offered on this ingredient
of the tort. What the court did seem to accept was that unlawful means
encompass all civil wrongs, including breach of confidence. We await (and
need) further guidance in this critical area.
2. The scope of the tort of inducing breach of contract.-The true nature of the
action for inducing breach of contract-what intention is required and
what knowledge of the claimant's contract is necessary-was at the heart
of Mainstream Properties. The claimant in this case was a property develop-
ment company. The defendant had provided financing to two employees of
the claimant company, to allow them to exploit an opportunity to develop a
site that had first been offered to their employer. In so doing, the employ-
ees were acting in breach of their contracts of employment. The defendant
knew of the claimant company's business, knew of the employees' position
in that business, and factually agreed that in providing the finance as he did
he had "interfered" with the contracts of employment between the em-
ployees and the claimant. As Lord Justice Arden noted, "he had provided
finance to enable [the employees] ... to appropriate for themselves an op-
portunity which belonged to their employer." '' However, when sued for
inducing breach of contract he claimed that he lacked the necessary inten-
tion for that tort. The trial judge found as a fact that the defendant genu-
io9 Roderick Bradshaw, Can the Economic Torts be Unified? 18 0. 1. L. S. 729, 730 (1998).
i 1o Proposed by various leading commentators such as Weir, Sales, and Stiltiz, and by
Lord Denning (the modern architect of the tort of unlawful interference with trade). These
suggest that "impermissible," "illegitimate," or "acts the defendant is not at liberty to commit"
could be possible definitions of "unlawful means."
i i i Mainstream Prop. v. Young, [2005] EWCA (Civ) 86a, [2]. The employees themselves
were successfully sued for their breach of contract.
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inely believed (prior to the commitment to finance) that there would be no
breach by the employees as they had assured him there was "no conflict of
interest"." Though the defendant had "spotted a potential conflict"" 3 he
had relied on the reassuring lies of the employees.
The issue became the nature of the "intention" required for this tort
and, indeed, the nature of the knowledge of the contract required for the
tort. Both ingredients were uncertain, primarily because of case law con-
cerning industrial disputes where wide definitions had been accepted, at
odds with the previous judicial approach. So, for example, Lord Denning in
Emerald Construction v Lowthian' 4 asserted that a deliberate indifference to
the plaintiff's rights could be sufficient and suggested that liability would
ensue where the defendant had the means of knowledge which they had
deliberately disregarded.
As far as the intention was concerned, the Court of Appeal, having
heard the submissions of the parties following the Hello! decision, decided
that a strict definition should be applied to all the general economic torts.
Lady Justice Arden noted that the Court of Appeal in Hello! provided a
"panoramic overview of the case law on intention in all economic torts,""' 5
providing an "holistic approach to intention in all economic torts."' ' 6 Prob-
able or reckless harm was not sufficient. The claimant must show that the
harm was the aim of the defendant (for whatever reason). This required
the definition of intention to involve subjective intention and the rejection
of any definition that allowed for "constructive" intention (i.e., deemed
intention, based on the reasonable man).
117
Similarly, a strict view of the defendant's requisite knowledge of the
claimant's contract was adopted by the Court of Appeal. Constructive
knowledge, or a situation in which reasonable man should have realised
that the contract would be breached, was rejected. Nor was a mistaken
view of the legal effect of the employees' contract relevant. The defen-
dant was not liable, as he did not know that the employees were acting in
breach of their contractual obligations and clearly, therefore, did not intend
to cause such a breach.
11 Id. at 17]. In part this was because there had been an earlier deal that the claimant had
not shown any interest in. This made it more feasible to accept that the defendant believed
that the claimant had also rejected this second development deal.
113 Id.
1 4 Emerald Constr. Co. v. Lowthian, (1966) i W.L.R. 691, 700.
115 Mainstream Prop., Ltd. v. Young, [2005] EWCA (Civ) 861, 1391.
it6 Id.
117 Id. at [ nf1. Lady Justice Arden developed the policy agenda already sketched out
in HelloL So the tort should not become virtually equivalent to the enforcement of a contract
against third parties; the courts should be reluctant to award damages for purely economic loss
and an overbroad tort would discourage competition and inhibit entrepreneurialism.
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3. The relationship of the torts of unlawful interference with trade and inducing
breach of contract.-The relationship of this "genus" tort to the tort of in-
ducing breach of contract is unclear. We have seen that the courts have
(without adequate debate, I would contend) allowed the Lumley v. Gye tort,
based on a direct inducement to breach of contract, to develop wider vari-
eties. The varieties identified by Lord Justice Jenkins in Thomson (in what
was it should be emphasised an ex tempore judgment), direct intervention
and indirect intervention in the contract, have been accepted by courts
and commentators alike. A moment's reflection, however, reveals that these
"varieties" are in fact misplaced as varieties of the Lumley v. Gye tort. Rath-
er, it becomes clear that both are in fact varieties of the "genus" economic
tort unlawful interference with trade.
This grey area between the torts of inducing breach and unlawful inter-
ference was in reality at the heart of the third economic tort case to go from
the Court of Appeal to the House of Lords in 2006: OBG, Ltd. v. Allan."'
Yet, as will be seen, the Court of Appeal refused to acknowledge this.
Here the claimant companies sued the receivers who had been inval-
idly appointed over them. The claimants alleged that the receivers' han-
dling of the "run off" of the claimants' contracts led to less satisfactory out-
comes than the claimants (through their liquidators) would otherwise have
achieved. It was accepted that the company would have received more in
its negotiations with contract partners had the receivers not been involved.
In reality, the claim was, if anything, a negligence claim based on the claim-
ants' grievances as to the defendants' management of their contract claims.
Because no fault was alleged, this claim would have been hopeless. So,
the action focused on the receivers' invalid assumption of control over the
claimants' contracts. As there is no tort of "wrongfully taking control of a
business" the claimants sought to rely on the tort they identified as "inter-
ference" with the claimants' contract rights. The allegation was that the
invalid assumption of control over the outstanding contracts was covered
by such a tort. One view of this claim would be that the claimants were
attempting to extract and merge the most favourable ingredients from the
two most important general economic torts, inducing breach and unlaw-
ful interference with trade, in order to come up with an extended form of
economic tort liability. They could not show an unlawful act and could not
show targeted harm, thereby ruling out a claim based on unlawful interfer-
ence with trade; nor could they pursue a claim based on "pure" Lumley v.
Gye because no contract had been breached." 9 Their solution was to graft
Lumley v. Gye "intention" (reworked as intention to cause not breach of
contract but rather "interference with contractual relations") onto the pro-
18 OBG, Ltd. v. Allan, [2005] EWCA (Civ) io6.
i 19 td. at 66. Indeed, as Lord Justices Peter Gibson and Carnwath noted, no performance
had been hindered. In fact quite the opposite had occurred: the performance had been
continued.
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tected interest (trade/economic relations) of the tort of unlawful interfer-
ence with trade.120
Quite rightly, the majority of the Court of Appeal-Peter Gibson and
Carnwath, L.JJ.-rejected this claim. Peter Gibson and Carnwath LJJ re-
fused to extend the tort beyond cases where the defendant's action re-
sulted in breach, prevention, or hindrance of the claimant's contract rights.
The tort was limited to interference "aimed at procuring a failure to com-
ply with some obligation imposed by a term of the contract,"1 '' and did not
extend to "interference" by a defendant in the sense of taking over the
performance of the claimant's contracts."2 '
However, overall, the analysis in the Court of Appeal was disappointing.
There was a strong dissenting view from Lord Justice Mance (whose argu-
ments on this point, according to Lord Justice Carnwath, had "considerable
theoretical force") who found in favour of the claimants. To do so, he was
willing to accept that this tort now extended to "interference with a pre-
existing contractual or legalposition,"12 3 seemingly an attempt to refocus the
tort from protecting contract rights to protection of "business interests." ' 4
In his view, in the direct form of this tort no unlawful means needed to
have been used for liability to be imposed.2 ' If right this would be a radical
extension of economic tort liability, but it is unlikely to be accepted by the
House of Lords.
More worrisome, however, was the approach of the majority of the Court
of Appeal, despite their rejection of the claim. On the facts of OBG it should
have been clear that there was no viable claim for inducing breach of con-
tract or any other variety of that or any other economic tort. The Court of
Appeal approached the claimants' case by accepting certain truths. These
were: that the economic tort relied upon by the claimants, "wrongful inter-
120 Id. at i. In effect they combined the most advantageous features of each action while
discarding the key limiting features (procuring a breach or causing deliberate harm by means
of an unlawful act).
121 Id. at 47. In other words there must be a breach of contractual obligation-at least the
prevention of the due performance of a primary obligation (even if no secondary obligation to
pay damages comes into existence).
122 Id. Although in this case the receivers clearly intended to "interfere" with the
claimants' business by managing their contracts, to apply the tort to such a case (where after
all the contracts were being performed) "would be to change the nature of the tort," for no
good reason of policy, according to Lord Justice Carnwath. Id.
123 Id. at 79 (emphasis added).
124 For a better analysis of cases on this point, see Meade v. Haringey London Borough
Council, [19791 I.C.R. 494, and Prudential Assurance Co. v. Lorenz, (971) i K.I.R. 78. These
cases indicate that the tort protects interference with legal rights, not simply a legal position.
125 See OBG, Ltd. v. Allan, [zoo5] EWCA (Civ) io6, 85. Moreover, there was sufficient
intention as the defendants had "aimed" to take over the claimants' contracts, even though
no economic harm was intended. So Lord Justice Mance, by extending the interest being
protected by this tort, and asserting that an intention to "meddle" in the business of the
claimant was sufficient, would have allowed the claimants to succeed on this tort.
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ference with contract relations," existed; that it was derived from Lumley v.
Gye, and that liability for "wrongful interference with contractual relations"
was fundamentally different from the tort of unlawful interference with
trade.1 16 This builds on the tendency to accept the uncertainties and lack
of coherence in the development of the tort of inducing breach of contract.
Since the emergence of the economic tort of unlawful interference with
trade, the need has arisen for a clear demarcation between the true scope
of the tort of inducing breach of contract and that of the "genus" interfer-
ence tort. Only such an enterprise will keep these torts on the straight and
narrow in the face of claimants' insistence on ever-increasing protection of
their economic interests.
III. THE GENERAL ECONOMIC TORTS: THE PURIST APPROACH
AND THE HOUSE OF LORDS' AGENDA
From the above discussion, it is clear that the mess of the general economic
torts needs to be sorted in English common law. This writer has consis-
tently argued that only a "purist" approach to the general economic torts
would provide coherence to this area of the law. In spring 2007, the House
of Lords 12 7 handed down its decisions in the trilogy of economic tort cases
(Douglas v Hello!; Mainstream Properties v Young, OBG v Allen).128 It is crucial
therefore to explore what is in effect the twenty-first century agenda set by
the House of Lords for these torts-for they clearly accepted that this tril-
ogy of cases represented an opportunity "to give a coherent shape" -29 -and
to compare that to the purist solution.
A. The Purist Solution
The mess of the general economic torts needs to be sorted in English com-
mon law. The "purist" view of these torts would provide coherence in the
following way.30
First, the tort of inducing breach of contract would be limited to its clas-
sic Lumley v. Gye setting and clearly distinguished from unlawful interfer-
126 Id. at i.
127 The same panel-Lords Hoffmann, Nicholls, Walker, and Brown, and Baroness Hale
-heard all three cases consecutively.
IZ8 Douglas v Hello!; Mainstream Properties v Young; OBG v Allen, [2007] U.K.H.L.
21.
129 Id. at [320] (Lord Brown).
13o And in addition to what follows, which focuses on the issues before the House of
Lords in 2oo6, simple conspiracy would be rejected as a tort and certainly not be used for any
understanding of the role of the general economic torts. Though little used, it is a blot on the
coherence of these torts, being a purely interventionist form of civil liability, requiring neither
unlawful acts nor an attack on the rights of the claimant by participation in another's wrong.
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ence with trade. In so distinguishing, the different rationales for these two
areas of economic tort liability would be established.
Lumley v. Gye gives us a tort focused on the claimant's contract rights;
it penalises a defendant who directly induces a breach of that contract. No
unlawful means are necessary. Rather, the tort demands a knowledge of
the contact, an intention that it should be breached and most importantly
persuasion directed at the co-contractor. That persuasion or inducement is
the necessary link between the broken contract and the defendant, a third
party to that contract. Weir notes: "[i]f I persuade someone, whether by
stick or carrot, to conduct himself at variance with his duties under a con-
tract, I have altered his conduct, I have perverted him, or converted him to
my use as a means of inflicting harm which otherwise would not occur."'
13 1
No "extra" unlawful means are necessary for liability since, as Lord Justice
Jenkins noted in Thomson v. Deakin, direct persuasion, with the requisite
knowledge and intention, "is clearly to be regarded as a wrongful act in
itself.""3 '
The tort established in Lumley v. Gye in effect created a new form of
secondary liability, following the same pattern for imposing liability as the
doctrine of joint tortfeasance.' 33 The defendant is liable for inducing or pro-
curing a civil wrong, though the tort allows that wrong to be a breach of
contract rather than another tort. Simply to cause an "interference" with
"contractual relations" cannot be sufficient; there must be a direct induce-
ment and a breach of contract. If no such inducement or breach arises, the
separate tort of unlawful interference with trade should be the only hope
for the claimant. The "gospel-like" quality of Lord Justice Jenkins' analy-
sis of the "varieties" of the tort of Lumley v. Gye should be rejected. The tort
of unlawful interference with trade is a completely separate economic tort,
with a different framework and different components.
In situations where the real issue is not that the defendant has per-
suaded another to break their contract with the claimant but, rather, that
the defendant has prevented or interfered with the contract's performance,
in effect there is a different focal point for liability assessment. Aggres-
sive (but acceptable) competitive practice may result in such interference.
An example given in Torquay Hotel v. Cousins'- is a deliberate cornering
of the market in order to prevent a contract from being performed. How-
ever, ruthless competition will not justify the imposition of economic tort
liability. For this reason, in the absence of persuasion or inducement, the
defendant must be shown to have used unlawful means.
131 TONY WEIR, ECONOMic TORTS 34 (1997).
132 Thompson v. Deakin, 11952] Ch. 646,694.
133 See HAZEL CARTY, AN ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC TORTS 271-73 (2ooi) for a more
detailed analysis.
134 Torquay Hotel Co. v. Cousins, 11969] 2 W.L.R. 289.
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Here it is the use by the defendant himself of unlawful means to inten-
tionally harm the claimant that justifies the imposition of liability. Unlike
Lumley v. Gye this is primary liability. The defendant having used unlawful
means against a third party, the claimant is given a cause of action that is
parasitic on those unlawful means used by the defendant. The rationale
of this tort is not the protection of contract rights 35 but rather to render
unlawful economic harm aimed at the claimant and effected by means of
unlawful acts by the defendant. Given the tort arises from directed harm
and unlawful means, "trade" in a general sense can be protected.
This clear distinction between the rationales of inducing breach and
interference with trade requires the courts to clearly distinguish between
"procurement" of contract breach and mere "interference" with contract
performance. 36 The former is at the heart of Lumley v. Gye liability; the lat-
ter as such cannot in itself (i.e., in the absence of unlawful means) justify
economic tort liability, given that it is in the nature of successful, aggressive
competition. Nor is there a need for a separate tort of indirect interference
with contract. All agree that where "indirect" interference with contract is
involved, unlawful means have to be used, this being liability that arises
not from Lumley v. Gye but from what is now recognised to be the tort of
unlawful interference with trade. Liability in this context does not centre
on the claimant's contract rights but rather on the presence of "unlawful"
means used by the defendant to harm the claimant's business. There is
thus no need for a tort of unlawful/wrongful interference with contractual
relations.
This proposed "purist" realignment of the parameters of the general
economic tort can be achieved by simply revisiting three key decisions :
Thomson v. Deakin, 37 Torquay Hotel,138 and Merkur Island, 3 9 which chartered
the so-called "extensions" to Lumley v. Gye tort. The extempore decision of
Lord Justice Jenkins in Thomson v. Deakin,140 in which he sought to include
direct and indirect interference with a contract, in the identification of the
tort of inducing breach of contract led to what were in fact early cases of
unlawful interference with trade being wrongly classified as Lumley v. Gye
liability, where in effect it is the presence of unlawful means that is impor-
135 Though that may happen as a result.
136 So procurement of a civil wrong is tortious (both within the doctrine of joint
tortfeasance and the tort of inducing breach of contract), but simple "interference" with a
right is not. Interference forms the basis of economic tort liability where that interference is
aimed at the claimant's economic interests ("trade") and achieved by means of the defendant's
unlawful act.
137 D.C. Thomson & Co. v. Deakin, [19521 Ch. 646.
138 Torquay Hotel Co. v. Cousins, (1969) 2 Ch. io6.
139 Merkur Island Shipping Corp. v. Laughton, (1983) 2 A.C. 570 (H.L.)
14o Thomson v. Deakin, 11952) Ch. 646.
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tant, not the ultimate contract breach.' 4 1 It also led to the loose notion of
"interference" creeping into the tort of inducement. This identification of
varieties should be rejected. In Thomson v. Deakin itself, where the Court of
Appeal essentially decided that unlawful means had to be present where
no direct procurement of the claimant's contract was involved. As for the
decisions in Torquay Hotel and Merkur Island, they were both cases where
the defendant did not directly attack the claimant's contract. They both
involved indirect use of unlawful means (working through another party's
workforce) to cause problems for the claimant's trade/contractual relations.
In effect, it was a complete red herring for Lord Diplock in Merkur Island
to assert that there was a tort of unlawful interference with contract (ac-
cepting the views already maintained by Lord Denning in Torquay Hotelv.
Cousins). These cases constitute the modern acceptance of the tort of un-
lawful interference with trade. In fact, both Lord Diplock and Lord Den-
ning touch on this in their judgments. So in Merkur Island, Lord Diplock
noted the existence of the unlawful means tort, highlighting the fact that
"to fall within this genus of torts the unlawful act need not involve procur-
ing another person to break a subsisting contract .... ,,141
Secondly, the key concepts of "unlawful means" in the tort of unlaw-
ful interference with trade, "knowledge" in the tort of inducing breach of
contract, and "intention" in both torts, need to be strictly defined in ac-
cordance with the Court of Appeal decisions in Hello! and Mainstream. By
so doing, the courts would finally reject the wide definitions that largely
spring from judicial hostility to trade union activities. Of course, a clear sep-
aration of the tort of inducing breach of contract from the tort of unlawful
interference with trade clarifies the intention required in these two torts.
Where a procurement of breach is alleged, then an intention to procure that
breach of contract must be established. Where the tort of unlawful interfer-
ence with trade is alleged, the claimant must prove an intention to cause
economic harm, in the sense that the defendant "aimed" at harming the
claimant. Both have strict views of intention but what an individual intends
is different in these two torts.
B. The House of Lords' Agenda for the Twenty-first Century
In essence, these obstacles to understanding the modern role and coverage
of the general economic torts are raised in the three House of Lords' ap-
141 So even in cases of "direct intervention" (as opposed to "direct procurement")
cited by Lord Justice Jenkins, the better view is that unlawful means must be used by the
defendant. See, e.g., GWK, Ltd. v. Dunlop Rubber Co., (1926) 42 T.L.R. 376 (the trespass
committed in the case is used by Lord Justice Jenkins). Otherwise, as Lord Evershed MR
noted, in the case deliberately buying up all of a commodity in the market to undermine the
claimant's contract involving that commodity would be actionable (which it is not).
142 Merkur Island Shipping Corp. v. Laughton, (1983) 2 A.C. 570 (H.L.).
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peals heard at the end of 2006. These three decisions could provide the an-
swers to the uncertainties that have bedevilled these torts. Whether they
will or not is now discussed, taking the purist approach as the framework
for that discussion.
First, the House of Lords accepted the purist approach as to the ra-
tionale and role of the torts of inducing breach of contract and unlawful
interference with trade. The Court of Appeal in these three cases had gone
some way towards this. But the major stumbling block for this writer was
the lack of clear water they put between these two torts. This has now
been achieved. So the House of Lords accepted that these two key torts,
each have their own structure and a fundamentally different pattern of li-
ability. Inducing breach of contract is accepted to be a form of secondary
or accessory liability, requiring a breach by the claimant's contract partner,
procured by the defendant. The tort therefore provides a claimant with an
additional cause of action to the action in contract. Indeed it is apparent that
Lords Hoffmann and Nicholls accept that the principle behind this tort is
the same as that behind the doctrine of joint tortfeasance.' Inducement
therefore is an essential ingredient, mere interference being insufficient.
On the other hand, the tort of unlawful interference is a tort of primary
liability, allowing the claimant to sue a defendant who has used "unlawful
means" against a third party in order to harm the claimant. These two torts
are "essentially different," therefore,'" whereas the rationale of the former
is to treat "contractual rights as a species of property which deserve special
protection," the latter is concerned with intention and wrongfulness, being
"indifferent as to the nature of the interest which is damaged."' 45
The House of Lords correctly identified that the major uncertainty in
the scope of these two torts arose from the failure to identify the emer-
gence of the separate tort of unlawful interference (for which, see discus-
sion above). Thus the House reaffirmed the classic form of the Lumley tort
and expressly rejected the "direct" and "indirect" interference "varieties."
These are now rightly accepted to be examples of the unlawful interfer-
ence tort, as is the most malign result of this confused analysis-the hybrid
or half-way tort of interference with contractual relations (which was in-
deed the "tort" relied upon by the claimants in OBG). In essence, therefore,
the House of Lords has rejected the legal analysis of Lord Justice Jenkins
in Thomson v Deakin, Lord Denning in Torquay Hotel Co., Ltdv Cousins, and
Lord Diplock in Merkur Island Shipping v Laughton.
The House is to be congratulated for boldly taking these torts back to
first principles. 146 This return to basics accepts the philosophy of the deci-
143 Douglas v Hello!; Mainstream Properties v Young; OBG v Allen, [2007] U.K.H.L. 2 1,
[36] (Lord Hoffman). For the views of Lord Nicholls see id. at [170], [172].
144 Id. at [2641 (Lord Walker).
145 Id. at [321 (Lord Hoffman).
146 In particular the views of Lord Watson in Allen v Flood, [ 1898] AC 1, 96 who defined
2oo6-2oo71
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
sion in Allen v Flood viz that the common law should be wary of judging
the justification or otherwise of a defendant's competitive practices. 147 So
Lord Hoffmann notes: "it is commonplace that the law has always been
very wary of imposing any kind of liability for purely economic loss. The
economic torts ... are highly restricted in their requirement of an intention
to procure a breach of contract or to cause loss by unlawful means."'14 As
such the purist approach is mirrored in these decisions.
What, though, of the second aspect of the purist approach, namely the
need for a narrow definition of the ingredients of these torts? Here the
House of Lords proved less "purist" than the Court of Appeal. Though the
House of Lords determined that the same definition of intention should be
applied to the two key torts 49 and that only a subjective intention was suf-
ficient, Lords Hoffmann and Nicholls (unlike the Court of Appeal in Hello!
and Mainstream Properties) rejected the test of "targeted harm." Rather
they both required the court to identify "ends" and "means to ends" and
distinguish them from mere "consequences."'' 10 Intentional harm is thus
defined as either a desired end or the means of achieving a desired end.
The problem is that this test appears to create a wider definition of inten-
tion than "targeted harm." So, when applying the test of ends/means to
the facts of Hello!, Lord Hoffmann stated that he would have found in-
tentional harm to be present 5' (the opposite view to the Court of Appeal,
applying the "targeted" test). Their test, therefore, could conceivably en-
compass "inevitable harm." However, it may well be that future courts will
still apply the traditional "targeted" definition of intention to these torts.
Indeed, Baroness Hale referred to the defendant (in relation to both torts)
"deliberately striking at his target through a third party"'5 s and continues
in the same paragraph to label the claimant "the target." Uncertainty in the
application of these torts will continue, therefore.
the basis of liability for injuring a claimant through a third party thus:"In the first place, [the
defendant] will incur liability if he knowingly and for his own ends induces [another] to
commit an actionable wrong. In the second place, when the act induced is within the right of
the immediate actor ... it may yet be to the detriment of a third party and in that case ... the
inducer may be held liable if he can be shewn to have procured his object by the use of illegal
means directed against that third party."
147 Douglas v Hello!; Mainstream Properties v Young; OBG v Allen, [2007] U.K.H.L. 21,
[14] (Lord Hoffman, commenting that such a basis for liability "seems to have created a good
deal of uncertainty in the countries which have adopted such a principle").
148 Id. at [99]
149 Though obviously the Lumley tort clearly requires an intention to cause contract
breach rather than simply harm.
15o Douglas v Hello!; Mainstream Properties v Young; OBG v Allen, [2007] U.K.H.L. 21,
[43] (Lord Hoffman); id. at [164-65] (Lord Nicholls).
151 Id. at [1301, [134].
152 Id. at [306].
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As for the tort of unlawful interference with trade, though the House
of Lords acknowledged that the concept of "unlawful means" is "the most
important question concerning this tort"' 5 3 the House was not unanimous
as to the correct scope to be given to this feature of the tort.'14 On the one
side, Lords Hoffmann, Walker,' Brown, and Baroness Hale favoured the
limited "purist" definition that unlawful means must involve those which
are "actionable" by the third party. However, Lord Nicholls subscribed to
a wider interpretation of unlawful means: for him all intentional economic
harm caused by "unacceptable means" should be prohibited. This would
mean that unlawful means embraces "all acts a defendant is not permit-
ted to do whether by the civil or criminal law".'56 Obviously, it is to be
regretted that the House did not speak with one voice and resolve what
has been a matter of uncertainty unsettling the application of this tort. It
is hard not to disagree with Lord Walker's prediction that neither approach
"is likely to be the last word."'57 And there is further uncertainty attached
to this tort, following the decision by Lord Hoffmann to add a "gloss" to the
established ingredients. He contended that not simply any unlawful act
(with an intention to cause loss to the claimant) would be sufficient, given:
"there is obviously no reason why a claimant should be entitled to rely on
the infringement of a third party's rights."'5 8 Rather, he asserted that the
intention to cause loss must be by "interfering with the freedom of a third
party to deal with the claimant.5 9 The tort according to Lord Hoffmann,
therefore, requires intentional harm to the claimant, the use by the defen-
dant of unlawful means against a third party and, in addition, the claimant
must have "an economic interest" in the third party who is the subject of
the defendant's wrongful interference.
With the Lumley tort, the House is happy to adopt the purist view that
the defendant must have actual knowledge that the effect of the pro-
curement will be a breach. Constructive knowledge is not sufficient and
neither is an allegation that the defendant, in believing there will be no
breach, has made a mistake of law (as was alleged in Mainstream).160 This is
153 Id. at 145] (Lord Hoffman).
154 Indeed they lacked unanimity as to the correct title of this tort: though Lord Nicholls
adopts the standard nomenclature-"interference with trade or business by unlawful means"
-id. at [1411 and Baroness Hale adopts a similar title ("tort of causing economic loss by
unlawful means"), id. at [302], the three remaining members of the House of Lords favour
the more general title provided by Lord Hoffmann. He terms this tort that of "causing loss by
unlawful means," id. at [6].
155 Id. at [270]
156 Id. at [16z].
157 Id. at [2691.
158 Id. at [6o].
159 Id. at [51].
16o Seeid. at [2011 (Lord Nicholls).
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to be welcomed. However Lords Hoffmann'61 and Nicholls 161 also accepted
that though negligence would not be sufficient, reckless indifference to the
breach or making a conscious decision "not to enquire in case he discov-
ered a disagreeable truth"1 63 would suffice. This accepts the view of Lord
Denning in Emerald Construction Co., Ltd. v Lowthian. 6 This widens the
tort and fails to follow the purist line.
1 6
1
Overall, therefore, though the House of Lords is to be commended for
providing a coherent "purist" framework for these torts, the way the House
of Lords-and individual members of the panel-dealt with the specific
ingredients reveals some inconsistencies and a failure to adopt a fully purist
approach. This writer remains unconvinced that the economic torts have
been finally put on the straight and narrow.
IV. THE MISREPRESENTATION ECONOMIC TORTS
A. The Contrast Between the Torts of Malicious Falsehood and Passing Off
There are two economic torts that focus liability on the defendant's mis-
representation: the tort of malicious falsehood and the tort of passing off.
166
161 Id. at [411.
162 Id. at [i92].
163 Id. at 1691 (Lord Hoffman).
164 Emerald Construction Co., Ltd. v Lowthian, [19661 1 WLR 691.
165 Overall in terms of the outcomes of the appeals: in Mainstream Properties, the House
were unanimously of the view that there was no inducement to contract breach by the
defendant (given he genuinely if rather naively believed that the claimant's contract partners
would not be in breach; in OBG, the House unanimously found that there was no hybrid
economic tort of unlawful interference with contractual performance; in Hello!, the claimant
failed on the tort of unlawful interference. Essentially, only Lords Hoffmann and Nicholls
dealt with this appeal in detail and both rejected the claim because they felt that there was
no 3 party structure to the harm caused by the defendant. Lord Hoffmann determined that as
Hello! owed a duty of confidentiality to OK! the tort of unlawful interference did not apply;
Lord Nicholls determined that as Hello! did not owe a duty of confidentiality there were no
unlawful means (!).
166 The tort of deceit could also be included here. Although originally tied in with the
development of contract law (and useful in claims of false warranty) the action was clearly
separated from contract law in the case of Pasley v. Freeman, ( 789) 3 Term. Rep. 5 1, where the
court emphasised the defendant's dishonesty and consequent deception of the plaintiff, even
though the defendant did not himself gain from that deception. The tort was subsequently
summed up by Parke B. in Langridgev. Levy, [1837] All E.R. 586, as requiring "a falsehood told
with an intention that it should be acted upon by the party injured" which causes damage to
him. Id. As it is the person intentionally deceived who can sue it is, however, a tort of limited
importance in the area of trade competition. To lie about your own goods to gain a competitive
advantage is not per se the tort of deceit as Heydon notes ,"it is of little use to a competitor
of the liar; he has not acted to his detriment on a false statement but rather has been injured
because others acted upon it." J.D. HEYDON, ECONOMic TORTS 87 (2d ed. 1978). In England
the regulation of "abusive" trading that acts to the detriment of consumers is done via specific
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The former's development and application mirrors the abstentionist ap-
proach outlined above. So the tort of malicious falsehood has not been the
subject of any important development, at least in its commercial applica-
tion. However, the tort of passing off has been a dynamic action since
the late Victorian era and at present stands at the edge of becoming a more
general unfair competition action. Though many have pinpointed the un-
certainty and lack of coherent analysis in the general economic torts, recent
years have shown that courts are undecided as to the best approach in the
application of the "protean" economic tort, passing off, and most recently
in its correct application to concerns over domain name protection and im-
age rights. As for the general economic torts, the courts need to address
directly the modern value of this tort.
B. The Tort of Malicious Falsehood
The tort of malicious falsehood existed in an earlier form, the action for
slander of title, from at least the end of the sixteenth century. In this guise
it protected against falsehoods denigrating the plaintiff's title to land. How-
ever, the tort expanded in the nineteenth century to cover a wider variety
of falsehoods, including slander of title to goods and disparagement as to
the quality of the plaintiff's goods. In view of the incremental development
of this tort it has attracted various names, including injurious falsehood,"6
trade libel, 169 and disparagement 7 ' of goods. However on the whole it is
now referred to as "malicious falsehood," a term that best fits the ingredi-
ents of the action. The essentials of the action are that the defendant has
published "maliciously" about the claimant "words which are false" that
legislation. See, e.g., The Financial Services Act, 1986, c.8, § 227; The Trades Descriptions Act,
1968, c. 29, § 2 (codes of practice and self-regulation).
167 There has been an interesting development where the falsehood causes mental
distress. In Khodaparastv. Shad, (2ooo1 1 All E.R. 545, the Court of Appeal awarded aggravated
damages where the defendant had circulated material falsely indicating that the claimant had
been involved in telephone sex services. She obtained damages not only for the consequent
loss of her job as a teacher, but also for the anxiety and distress caused.
168 Coined by Sir John Salmond and used (of course) in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 623A (977).
169 This, however, erroneously ties the tort to defamation. Though there are similarities
(in particular the need for untruths published to a third party), this action was not derived
or descended from the defamation torts of libel and slander. The focal point of malicious
falsehood involves a complaint about damage to purely financial interests, whereas defamation
concerns aspersions on the good name of the claimant. However, it is true to say that the same
facts can give rise to both actions where defamatory words could damage financial prospects.
Cozens-Hardy, M.R. in Gniffiths v. Benn, [191] 27 TL.R. 346 commented: "words used, though
directly disparaging the goods, may also impute such carelessness, misconduct or want of skill
in the conduct of his business by the trader as to justify an action of libel." Id. at 350.
17o Again a misleading nomenclature. Though very commonly disparagement will be
the essence of the falsehood such is not necessary for the action to arise.
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are "calculated to harm" the claimant (i.e., likely to harm) and cause him
harm in the sense of economic harm.'71 Though very commonly disparage-
ment or denigration will be the essence of the falsehood, these elements
are not necessary for the action to arise. In one of the leading cases, the tort
applied to a claim based on the false statement that the plaintiff had ceased
to carry on business. 7
The key constraint on the application of this tort is the necessity for
the claimant to prove "malice" on the part of the defendant. Malice can,
in theory, involve two very different allegations: malice in the sense of
"spite" and malice in the sense of lies, i.e., knowledge of the falsity of the
statement that is calculated to harm.'73 Whereas spite malice will render
the defendant liable, even if there is an honest belief in the truth of the
statement, deceit malice requires no "malicious" intent or motivation; even
indifference as to the effect of the lies on the claimant will not negate li-
ability. Clearly, in a commercial setting it is deceit malice that is the most
likely allegation.
It is the need to prove malice that severely limits the usefulness of this
tort. Indeed, the policy of keeping the tort within strict bounds was rein-
forced by the fact that its modern development occurred at the early stage
of the modern development of advertising. Where comparative advertising
is concerned, the aim of the trader may well be to denigrate or disparage,
but allegations of malicious falsehood has carried with it the danger that the
courts may become too involved in arbitrating on the competitive process.
In 1895 Lord Herschell underlined the lack of enthusiasm for applying the
tort to such claims lest they be turned "into a machinery for advertising
rival productions by obtaining a judicial determination which of the two
was the better." 7 4 So an allegation by the defendant of superiority over the
claimant's product may not be covered by the tort, even though false, if the
court believes it is merely an example of "self-commendation"'7" or that
171 Damage has to be proved, though the task has been rendered easier by statutory
intervention. Where the action arises in a commercial context the damage will be presumed
from the making of the statement. See The Defamation Act, 1952, c.66, §3.
172 See Ratcliffe v. Evans, (1892) 2 Q.B. 524.
173 Stable, J. in Wilts UnitedDaiies, LD v. Robinson, (1957) 57 R.P.C. 22o summarised the
position thus: "if you publish a defamatory statement about a man's goods which is injurious to
him, honestly believing that it is true, your object being your own advantage and no detriment
to him, you obviously are not liable." Id. at 237.
174 Whitev. Mellin, [18951 A.C. 154 (H.L.). He continued: "consider what a door would
be opened if this were permitted ... the Court would then be bound to inquire, in an action
brought, whether this ointment or this pill better cured the disease which it was alleged to
cure-whether a particular article of food was in this respect or that better than another." Id.
175 Of course the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS provides for a "conditional privilege"
allowing competitors to make unduly favourable comparison in which they do not believe "if
the comparison does not contain false assertions of specific unfavorable facts." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 649 (1977).
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the public are unlikely to be misled. The public are assumed to have com-
mon-sense and a certain amount of cynical scepticism where it comes to
advertising blurb. Courts will only want to get involved where "unaccept-
able" disparagement is involved in such advertising, and specific, precise
allegations are made where "a reasonable man would take the claim being
made as being a serious claim." 17 6 This policy is so well entrenched that it
has been applied to the comparative advertising provisions of the Trade
Marks Act of 1994 which allow "honest" comparative advertising using the
claimant's trade marks without permission.177
All in all, the abstentionist policy of the common law has a tight strangle
hold on this tort. The rise of the distributive trades trade rivalry was to be
encouraged, and the encouragement of even aggressive competition (and
the related unwillingness to become immersed in the disputes of trade ri-
vals) still holds back the courts."7 The tort has no likelihood of spawning an
unfair competition action as the courts have made it clear that lies as such
are not tortious, nor can claimants claim on the basis that the defendant has
gained an unfair competitive advantage by such lies. In Schulke &Mayr UK,
Ltd. v. Alkapharm UK, Ltd.'79 the claimant sought to argue that a false adver-
tisement commending the virtues of the defendant's rival product (without
any comparison with or naming of the claimant's product) was capable of
amounting to malicious falsehood, as there would be diversion of sales and
trade loss as a consequence of the lies. Justice Jacob viewed this claim as
a bold one, and held that any such radical extension would have to be left
to Parliament. In essence, therefore, the tort is no more than a safety net
for the most extreme forms of falsehood that directly affect the claimant's
economic interests.
C. The Tort of Passing Off
The contrast between the development of the tort of malicious falsehood
and the development of the tort of passing off could not be more stark.
The classic version of this tort involves a trader misrepresenting/"passing
off" his goods to third parties as the goods of the claimant. As a cause of
action, passing off proved attractive to commercial bodies because it pro-
vided relief not to those confused as a result of the misrepresentation (the
customers/consumers), but to the commercial party harmed by the misrep-
resentation. Moreover, the courts favoured this tort because it developed in
the early industrial period to meet the commercial need for the protection
176 De Beers Abrasive Prods., Ltd. v. Int'l Gen. Elec. Co., 0975) 2 All E.R. 599, 599.
177 See The Trade Marks Act, 1994, c.26, § io.
178 There is also a concern to preserve commercial free speech where there is a bona
fide reason for making the statements, a view strengthened by The European Convention on
Human Rights, Council of Europe, Nov. 1950
179 Schulke & Mayr UK, Ltd. v.Alkapharm UK, Ltd., [1999] F.S.R. 161.
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of trade marks and names, a need which the judiciary accepted was in the
public interest. And this was a development in which the courts of equity
were to play a major role, given that injunctions were the most favoured
remedy of plaintiffs relying on the tort. The tort was therefore unaffected
by the restrictive common law approach apparent in the development of
malicious falsehood liability.18 0 The combined effect of these two factors
was that equity could refashion this tort from one based on deceit,181 with
only a limited remit, to one of strict liability with assumed damage. The
focal point of the tort became not the defendant's intention but the mis-
representation, whether deliberate, 82 careless, or innocent. A key stage in
its development came in 1896 with the House of Lords' decision in Red-
daway v. Banham' which accepted that even descriptive terms would be
protected (provided they had attracted secondary meaning). This case was
followed in 1915 by Spalding v. Gamage,1' which provided the twentieth
century framework for the tort. This case identified "goodwill" or customer
connection as the property right protected by the tort (emanating from the
reputation of the claimant's products/services), rather than the trade mark
or name itself.8 5 The tort was acknowledged to protect "those indicators in
the process of commercial competition by which one rival distinguishes his
products or services from those of another."1
The modern emergence of this important tort indicated that it was an
elastic weapon against certain sorts of unfair competition, preventing the
defendant from reaping the benefit of the claimant's "good name, repu-
tation and connection." ' 7 Clearly, claimants were encouraged by judicial
comments that it is a "protean" tort, the subject of a continued develop-
18o The major expansion of the tort of malicious falsehood took place at the very end
of the nineteenth century so it did not develop parallel equitable protection, as the tort of
passing off did.
I81 The origins of the tort are unclear, there being an Elizabethan case that may have
been its precursor-or that case might have involved defamation instead. See generally Frank
I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARv. L. REv 813 (1927). The term
"passing off" was first used in the headnote of Parry v. Tvefift(1842) 49 E.R. 749.
182 Of course, if the intention of the defendant is to deceive, then the court may be very
willing to apply the tort even if it is not apparent that all the ingredients of the tort are present,
a phenomenon aided by the fact that the vast majority of passing off cases begin and finish at
the interim (preliminary) stage.
183 Reddaway v. Banham, [1896] A.C. 199 (H.L). Of course the fact that the other "trade
competition" tort-malicious falsehood-had been stifled by the courts was also a stimulus to
the development of the tort of passing off.
184 Spalding v. Gamage, (1915) 111 L.T 829.
185 Id.
186 W.R. Cornish, The International Relations of Intelletual Property, 52 C.L.J 46, 52
(1993).
187 See Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Muller & Co.'s Margarine, Ltd., [19ol] A.C.
217, 223. Lord Macnaghan stated that "[Goodwill] is the benefit and advantage of the good
name, reputation and connection of a business." Id.
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ment "to meet changing conditions and practices in trade." s Yet, in theory,
the boundaries of the tort were clear. The tort requires a misrepresenta-
tion, goodwill, and harm to that goodwill (or potential harm): the so-called
"classic trinity." All three ingredients link into each other, with customer
confusion as its cement. Classic passing off, claiming that the goods you are
selling emanate from the claimant when they do not, involves a source mis-
representation attacking the goodwill in that source. Such a misrepresenta-
tion attacks the customer connection, the value of the probability "that the
old customers will resort to the old place."'" 9 The rationale for this tort is
to protect traders"' 9 interests where it is in the public interest to do so.' 9' It
is a tort that protects the reliability of information passing between trader
and customer, clearly an aim which is in the public interest. Misrepresen-
tations that lead to confusion involve misdirected competitive effort. As
Naresh notes, "misrepresentations provide false information and thereby
distort the pattern of consumer choice, causing more of some products to
be purchased and less of others than would be the case if consumers were
accurately informed. This misallocation of resources is a social loss and its
prevention is clearly desirable."' The tort appeared justified on the basis
that it helps to lower consumer search costs, while the fact of legal protec-
tion provides incentives for companies to make investments to gain con-
sumer confidence in their products. The parallel with the classic rationale
for registered trade mark protection is obvious.
In theory, the extensions that twentieth century case law made to this
tort have complied with this trinity and its rationale. It soon became clear
that as well as the classic "source" misrepresentation, a misrepresentation
involving a misdescription of the claimant's goods might also be actionable.
Indeed, this was the very allegation in the leading case of Spalding v. Gam-
age.193 Here the quality of the claimant's goods being sold by the defendant
188 Lego v. Lego M. Lemelstrich, Ltd., [1983] F.S.R. 155, 185-86.
189 Lord Elton in Crutwellv. Lye, (18io) 1 Rose 123; 34 E.R. 129.
I9O And successful traders at that--only those traders with a customer connection or
customer experience are entitled to such protection. As Slade, J. noted in My Kinda Bones,
Ltd. v. Dr. Pepper's Stove Co.,[1984] FS.R. 289, 299: "prima facie, it seems to me, a substantial
number of customers or potential customers must at least have had the opportunity to assess
the merits of those goods or services for themselves."
191 This rationale of the tort was underlined by Lord Diplock in one of the leading
modern passing off cases, Erven Warnink Besloten Vennootschap v. J. Townend &Sons (Hull), Ltd.,
11979] A.C. 731 (known as the Advocaat case): "in an economic system which has relied on
competition to keep down prices and improve products there may be practical reasons why it
should have been the policy of the common law not to run the risk of hampering competition
by providing civil remedies to everyone competing in the market who has suffered damage to
his business or goodwill in consequence of inaccurate statements of whatever kind that may
be made by rival traders about their own wares." Id. at 742.
192 Suman Naresh, Passing-Off, Goodwill and False Advertising New Wine in Old Bottles, 45
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 97, 120 (1986).
193 Spalding v. Gamage, (1915) 111 L.T. 829 (Ch. D)
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was being misrepresented by the vendor. The public believed they were
being offered the best quality product, whereas they were in fact being sold
substandard examples of the claimant's produce, which should have been
consigned to the scrap heap. This can still be seen as a species of source
goodwill, focusing on harm to the claimant alone and attacking his good-
will, based on goods emanating from his control.
But the courts were willing to go further. In one of the most important
decisions in passing off, Erven Warnink Besloten Vennootschap v. J. Townend &
Sons (Hull), Ltd. '94(known as the Advocaat case), the House of Lords agreed
that the tort should be "extended" to include product misrepresentation,
where source was not in issue but rather the consumer was being misled as
to the type of product they were acquiring.
So, in Advocaat, a misrepresentation not affecting the plaintiff uniquely
was recognised to be part of this tort. The plaintiffs (together with other
traders) had for many years manufactured a liquor called Advocaat. The
essential ingredients of this product-what in short made the product
"Advocaat"-were a spirit, brandewijn, and egg yolks. Clearly anyone who
produced authentic Advocaat would be entitled to call it by that name;
customers would not associate the name with the plaintiffs alone. How-
ever, the plaintiffs objected to the defendants producing a rival product,
which they termed Old English Advocaat, from dried egg powder and Cy-
prus sherry. Given the lower costs involved, the defendants were able to
market their product at a lower price and captured a substantial part of
the plaintiffs' English market. Wanting to cry "foul" the plaintiffs sought
an extension of the tort of passing off. Although there was no source mis-
representation, they argued that "Advocaat" was a "product endowed with
recognisable qualities" 195 and that the defendants' product should not be
described as Advocaat (but rather was a form of egg flip). This "product
misrepresentation," though not affecting the plaintiffs alone (but, in theory
all genuine Advocaat producers), harmed the goodwill in the product. The
plaintiffs (amongst others) had created a reputation for the product proper-
ly described as Advocaat. As a result, it was argued that as a legitimate pro-
ducer of the product they had goodwill in that product, i.e., the customer
connection they were seeking to protect attached to the reputation of the
product rather than a single source. The plaintiffs' goodwill in the product
was damaged both by reduced sales and by the reputation of the product
being debased. The House of Lords agreed to this extension.
It is important to note, however, that in Advocaat the formula of the
classic trinity was still followed. Here there was a misrepresentation (good-
will in the customer connection with the product and harm to that good-
194 Erven Warnink Besloten Vennootschap v. J. Townend & Sons (Hull), Ltd., [1979]
A.C. 73i.
195 See Erven Warnink Besloten Vennootschap v. J. Townend & Sons (Hull), Ltd., [1979]
A.C. 731, 734.
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will); mere false advertising or labelling would not have been sufficient."9
Though some commentators predicted the potential for the development
of an "unfair trading" tort, this did not happen in the aftermath of this im-
portant extension.
Yet on closer inspection it is clear that some judges are more than willing
to expand the tort beyond the limits of the classic trinity, although admit-
tedly paying lip service to the parameters set by that formula. So despite the
concept of "goodwill" and its requirement of existing customer connection
being the property protected at the heart of the tort, some courts have been
willing to protect a product based simply on pre-launch publicity, rather
than customer experience. 197 More importantly, because these extensions
apply to a large number of modern cases, the acceptance of "connection"
misrepresentation as a material misrepresentation and of "dilution" as a
head of harm have played directly into the hands of those who seek to con-
vert this from a misrepresentation tort into a tort of misappropriation. Both
definitions of key aspects of the classic trinity add elements to the tort that
are vague and badly defined. In other words, they add imprecision to the
scope of the tort, and imprecision is the impetus to claimants' ever more
extravagant claims for the tort.
The notion of a "connection" misrepresentation if applied in a strict
fashion clearly builds on the classic "source" misrepresentation. If the
claimant must prove that the consumers will believe that the parties are
connected (in the sense that they will believe that the claimants have
somehow made themselves responsible for the quality of the defendants'
goods or services, a definition of connection suggested by Lord Millett in
Harrods, Ltd. v. Harrodian School, Ltd.9 "), then the tort has not been ex-
tended significantly. However, as is more common, if the court is willing
to see an implied connection should the consumer get the impression that
the claimant and defendant are "in some way connected," then clearly the
tort has been extended by a significant amount. The allegation of "connec-
tion" misrepresentation becomes, in effect, a way around the need to show
a misrepresentation.
196 Id. at 742. In fac... Lord Diplock provided a reworked definition of the characteristics
of passing off. He identified five features required for the tort: a misrepresentation; made by
a trader in the course of trade; to his prospective customers; calculated to injure the business
or goodwill of another; and which does so injure or probably will do so. But he went on to
acknowledge that these five features may not always be sufficient, that there may be factual
situations that contain all five features but do not give rise to the tort. It is perhaps not
surprising, therefore, that in subsequent passing off litigation the courts appear happier to
apply the "classic trinity" test. Id.
197 See, e.g., Elida Gibbs, Ltd. v. Colgate-Palmolive, Ltd., [1983] FS.R. 95, where an
expensive new promotional campaign for the plaintiff's yet to be launched product was
protected against the defendant's deliberate use of a similar advertising theme (designed to
undermine the plaintiff's launch).
198 Harrods, Ltd. v. Harrodian School, Ltd., [1996] R.P.C. 697, 712.
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And as for the relevant heads of damage in this tort, the traditional heads
of damage have been diversion of sales and injurious association. Diversion
of sales is most likely where the parties are in competition, while injurious
association can take a variety of forms, for example a false connection with
a disreputable or down-market defendant. Both of these heads of dam-
age clearly relate to the claimant's goodwill, his customer base. However,
over the years claimants have sought to enlarge the list of heads of damage
relevant to the tort of passing off, a quest rendered easier by the fact that
the most common remedy sought in contested passing off actions is an
interim (preliminary) injunction. Here a detailed discussion of the limits
of legal liability will not take place and indeed the balance of convenience
rather than legal definitions is likely to be the most important issue. So it
is tempting for claimants to test the water by slipping in wide formulations
of what constitutes damage for this tort. Though vague allegations such as
"loss of expansion potential," or "loss of licensing opportunities" may be
secondary to the main claim of diversion of sales or injurious association,
the concern is that heads of damage that are speculative and unrelated to
existing goodwill appear to be accepted and legitimised in this preliminary
litigation. And the vaguest allegation of harm, "dilution," has become ac-
cepted by the courts as part of this process.
Dilution was a concept championed by the American academic, Schech-
ter, in 1927.1" The theory behind the concept of dilution "is based on the
fact that the more widely a symbol is used, the less effective it will be
for any one user.' ' 00 Schechter believed that the law should protect marks
against "blurring," "tarnishment," or "erosion" of their magnetism. In 1993,
the Court of Appeal appeared to accept dilution as a legitimate head of
damage in passing off. In TaittingerSA v. Allbev, Ltd.,201 champagne produc-
ers attacked the use of the word "champagne" in the name of the defen-
dants' non-alcoholic drink, "Elderflower Champagne." Rather surprisingly
(at least to this writer) the court found there to be a connection misrep-
resentation, thus revealing how vague and protective of successful claim-
ants this allegation of connection can be. It is clear that in this sort of case
the real concern of those who own the prestige brand is that they wish to
prevent free riding on the advertising and marketing "pull" of their brand
name. That that is the real issue was underlined in this case; all three mem-
ber of the Court of Appeal highlighted the threat of dilution that the defen-
dants' activities posed. Thus Sir Thomas Bingham MR remarked: "[any
product which is not Champagne but is allowed to describe itself as such
ig9 Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HAxv.L.REv. 813
(1927).
zoo Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols,
57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1191 (1948).
201 Taittinger SAv. Allbev, Ltd., (1994) 4 All E.R. 75 (CA (Civ Div)).
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must inevitably ... erode the singularity and exclusiveness of the descrip-
tion Champagne [and cause damage] of an insidious but serious kind." 02
This acceptance of a vague connection misrepresentation and the
equally vague concept of dilution, taken together, have the potential for
taking the tort beyond its traditional field, into that of misappropriation.
In effect claimants increasingly use allegations of "connection misrepre-
sentation" to prevent free-riders on their success and if dilution is then the
accepted head of damage then in reality the claimed "false" connection in
itself appears to be sufficient to establish liability. The argument appears to
be that such misrepresentations dilute the distinctiveness of the name or
product involved, i.e., a false Sconnection appears to be passing off per se.
This leaves the classic trinity abandoned in favour of preventing free-rid-
ing or unjust enrichment. Protection focuses not on customer connection
but in reality on the worth of the name itself, although that is what was
rejected as a rationale for the tort way back in Spaldingv. Gamage. 3
That some judges are willing to countenance such a seismic shift in the
tort (though claiming to apply the classic trinity) is vividly demonstrated
in the case of Irvine v. Talksport, Ltd."° English law offers no particular
protection to names or images. Merely using another's name is not a wrong
in itself, and as for unauthorised images, in Corelli v. Wa/P05 the plaintiff, a
famous novelist, was unable to prevent the defendants publishing coloured
postcards showing imaginary incidents in her life. In the common law an
identifiable harm must be shown. However, the celebrity image case of
Irvine arose from the appreciation by the celebrity industry that the vague-
ness of a connection misrepresentation added to the vague allegation of
dilution (and the knock on effect of what is the actual goodwill being pro-
tected in such a claim) meant that the tort promised to be useful to the
industry in the twenty-first century.2 06
The case involves the first judicial acknowledgement that the tort of
passing off renders unlawful "false endorsement" involving a celebrity.
Here the defendants as part of their campaign to rebrand their radio station
into a sports-focused station sent promotional material to potential adver-
tisers. Included was a brochure on the front page of which was a photo-
graph of Eddie Irvine, the then successful Formula 1 driver. In fact, this
photograph had been digitally altered to remove the mobile phone that
202 Id. at 83.
203 Spalding v. Gamage, (1915) 1 1 L.T 829 (Ch. D)
204 Irvine v. Talksport, Ltd., (2002) All E.R. 414 (Ch. D.), (opinion by Laddie, J.). The
defendant appealed unsuccessfully to the Court of Appeal on the issue of liability, arguing
inter alia that the use of Irvine's image was analogous to that of a celebrity photograph on a
magazine cover. Irvine v. Talksport, Ltd., (2003) All E.R. 881 (CA (Ch. Div.)). The claimaint's
appeal was successful, however, on the assessment of damages. Id.
205 Corelli v. Wall, (i9o6) 22 TL.R. 532.
206 Irvine v. Talksport, Ltd., [20021 EWHC 367 (Ch. D.), 2002 2 All E.R. 414.
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Irvine had actually been holding and replace it with a portable radio bear-
ing the defendants' logo. Having not been paid for this use of his successful
image, the claimant alleged passing off and claimed the fee he would nor-
mally charge for the authorised use of his image in advertising. The judge
(and subsequently the Court of Appeal) found there to be a connection
misrepresentation (the public would wrongly believe that the celebrity was
"happy to be associated" with the defendants' service) and the harm to
goodwill involved was loss of licensing opportunity and dilution. 114
Rather than being a simple application of the classic trinity, on closer
inspection the application of the tort in this way involves a radical depar-
ture. The decision can be interpreted as providing protection against mis-
appropriation of fame. The trial judge noted that the celebrity's "fame and
personality" were exploited, the defendants "squatting" on his magnetism
with this unlicensed use likely to "reduce, blur or diminish" the exclusiv-
ity of Irvine's reputation. 0 7 In order to prove misrepresentation, the claim-
ant had relied on the rather tenuous "connection" misrepresentation. The
harm was essentially dilution, and the property being protected was not
goodwill in the traditional sense of source goodwill (or even the extended
form of product goodwill), but rather the claimant's promotional goodwill. 08
In essence, the defendants were found to have acted unfairly and were to
pay for taking advantage of a reputation without paying for it.
V. THE MISREPRESENTATION ECONOMIC TORTS: SUMMARY AND SUGGESTIONS
Clearly the tort of malicious falsehood will not expand. It is apparent that
its main use since Victorian times-namely to prevent comparative adver-
tising that misleads the consumer-is now likely to be caught by the provi-
sions of registered trade mark law. Indeed, Jacob, J. in Cable & Wireless PLC
v. British Telecommunications PLC,209 considered that in comparative adver-
tising disputes the additional claim based on malicious falsehood added
nothing but simply increased costs. 10
However, the tort of passing off is at a crossroads in its development in
England. Pressure from amongst others, including the celebrity industry
and commercial bodies concerned about such unfair practices on the inter-
207 The judge, did however contrast endorsement from "mere" merchandising. The
latter simply exploits images which have become famous without necessarily implying
endorsement-the celebrity image on a T-shirt, for example. Id. at [9]. To underline the
distinction he was making, Lord Laddie exampled the sale of memorabilia relating to the
late Diana, Princess of Wales. He noted: "a porcelain plate bearing her image could hardly be
thought of as being endorsed by her, but the enhanced sales which may be achieved by virtue
of the presence of her image is a form of merchandising." Id.
2o8 Id. at [38].
209 Id. at 139].
2 10 Cable & Wireless PLC v. British Telecommunications PLC, [19o8] ES.R. 383.
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net as cyber-squatting and phishing, 1 ' are determined to push the bound-
aries of this tort well beyond the confines of its misrepresentation roots into
the area of protection against misappropriation. The judiciary seem divided
on this. So while Irvine appears a major victory for the expansionists, Light-
man, J. in an earlier "celebrity" case (Panini SpA v. Halliwelfl') asserted
that the concept of "endorsement" (in the context of a fan magazine) re-
quired that "the public would believe, on seeing the defendants' publica-
tion, that it was published by the plaintiffs or that its quality was authorised
by them."1 3 Again, while in 1981 the Privy Council (in effect the House of
Lords sitting on Commonwealth appeals) in Cadbury Schweppes Ply., Ltd.
v. Pub Squash Co."14 stressed that the tort centred on a misrepresentation
not misappropriation,"' s some twenty years later Aldous LJ, in the Court of
Appeal decision Arsenal Football Club PLC v. Matthew Reed,1 6 commented
that the tort of passing off could "perhaps best [be] referred to as unfair
competition" and that "[t]he traditional form of passing off.., is no longer
definitive of the ambit of the cause of action." ' 7
z11 Id. at 385.
212 See British Telecommunications PLC v. One In a Million, Ltd., [1998 All E.R. 476
(CA) (mere registration and maintenance of deceptively similar domain name potentially an
instrument of deception and passing off). This decision was followed in GlobalProjects Mgmt.,
Ltd. v. Citigroup, Inc., [20051 EWHC 2663 (Ch), [2oo6] F.S.R. 39 (Ch. D.) (Park, J.) and Phones
4 ULtd. v. Phone4U.co.uk Internet, Ltd., [zoo6l EWCA Civ 244 (CA (Civ. Div.), [20071 R.P.C. 5.
In the case of Nat'lAss'n of Software &Serv. Companies v. Sood, [20051 ES.R.38 (HC India),
the defendant had engaged in "phishing" on the internet (i.e., he had fraudulently claimed in
emails he circulated that those emails originated from the claimant company). This was done
in order to obtain information from the email recipients which the defendant then used to
his own advantage (to recruit). An interim injunction was awarded, such activity amounting
to passing off. Id.
213 Bernard M. Nyman, Passing Off-Sale of "Unofficial" Merchandise, ENrT. L.R. 8(5), E-94
-95 (1997) (commenting on the unreported case of Paninia SpA v. Halliwell).
214 Id. at E-94. Indeed, the Court of Appeal in Elvis Presley Enterprises Inc. v. Sid Shaw
Elvisly Yourr Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc., [1999] R.P.C. 567 (CA (Civ. Div.)), when asked to
accept a free-standing general right to character exploitation enjoyable exclusively by the
celebrity, rejected the argument, characterising it as an "extravagant claim." Id. at 582.
215 Cadbury Schweppes Pty., Ltd. v. Pub Squash Co., (1981) All E.R. 213 (PC (Aus)).
z16 See Cadbury Scweppes Pty., Ltd. v. Pub Squash Co., [I98i] i All E.R. 213. Similarly,
Justice Jacob in Hodgkinson Corby, Ltd. v. Wards Mobility Servs., Ltd., [19951 FS.R. I69, 174
(Ch. D.), stated that "[tihere is no tort of copying. There is no tort of taking a man's market
or his customers. Neither the market nor the customers are the plaintiff's to own." The same
judge later stressed the need to prove misrepresentation in the tort of passing off. He rejected
a clever attempt by the claimant trade mark owners to allege misrepresentation where the
defendant parallel importer debranded the claimant's trade marked goods and distributed
them with only the generic name of the drug on the boxes. This was held not to amount to
a misrepresentation that the drugs inside the box were sourced from a generic manufacturer
rather than the claimants. Boehringer Ingelheim KG v. Swingward, Ltd., [20041 EWCA (Civ)
129,1521-[56].
217 Arsenal Football Club PLC v. Matthew Reed, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 696 (CA), (2003)
3 All E.R. 865.
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This conflict of judicial opinion is neatly exampled by the recent High
Court case of L'Oreal SA v. Bellure AV318 The claimants in a trade mark
infringement case involving the defendants' perfumes which though not
counterfeits were allegedly "smell-alikes" (equivalents of the claimant's
famous perfumes) also claimed passing off. The claimants argued that the
tort had developed to include dilution of the value of goodwill/exclusivity,
rather than being dependent on deception. Relying on dicta by Lord Jus-
tice Aldous in ArsenalFCv. Reed, they argued that the tort had evolved so as
to protect against "unfair competition." 1 9 The defendants' original applica-
tion to strike out this claim was originally refused by one High Court judge,
presumably on the basis that the claim was at least arguable.2 0 However,
subsequently a different High Court judge refused to accept this approach
to the tort of passing off, holding that the tort of passing off required a
deception or misrepresentation as "if it were not so, competition would be
stifled.""'1
. The likelihood is that the courts will be pressed to continue developing
the tort of passing off. In essence, claimants seek to expand this from a mis-
representation tort with the public interest at its heart, to a nebulous tort
protecting against "theft" of a market or commercial asset. For the courts
the stark choice is between a tort of limited application, bounded by the
certainty of the classic trinity and a wide tort based on misappropriation,
with the attendant danger that it might constitute an undue constraint on
the competitive process.22
VI. RELATED CAUSES OF ACTION PROTECTING ECONOMIC INTERESTS
The above is a review of the torts which in English common law have their
main purpose the protection of economic interests. However, for the sake
of completeness, and to indicate the overall judicial policy on the protec-
tion of purely financial loss, two further causes of action need to be ad-
dressed.
A. The Role of the Tort of Negligence in the Protection of Economic Interests
The major tort of the twentieth century, and clearly remaining so in this
century, the tort of negligence was freed from the confines of a specific
range of instances of negligence liability by the "neighbour principle" es-
218 L'Oreal SAv. Bellure NV, [20031 EWCA (Civ) 696, 170] (CA).
219 Id.
22o L'Oreal v. Bellure, [zoo6l EWHC 2355, [t65] (Ch), 2007 R.P.C. 14.
221 Id. at [1661.
222 L'Oreal v. Bellure, [2oo6 EWHC 2355, [1631 (Ch. D.) (Lewison, j.).
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poused by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v. Stevenson.113 By focusing the tort on
the duty to take care not to harm your "neighbour", the action became "a
fluid principle of civil liability." '24 However, this fluidity only applied to
the negligent infliction of physical harm, though for a time the courts ap-
peared to lose sight of this." 5 The general rule remains that this tort does
not protect against the infliction of purely financial harm. So the recovery
of what is termed "pure economic loss" in negligence is subject to a policy
of limitation to prevent far-reaching and potentially limitless liability, and
to prevent the tort from undermining any contractual framework that links
the parties. Essentially, the tort protects pure economic interests where
there is a negligent misstatement with a "special relationship" between
the parties (requiring an assumption of responsibility or proximity) or the
negligent performance of a beneficial service, usually performed under
contract. Though some might argue that this also is an economic tort such
a label would be misleading. There is no willingness to create a general
principle of liability for negligently inflicted economic harm, nor can it be
argued that the prime function of this tort is to protect economic interests.
Rather, in exceptional circumstances the tort of negligence can perform the
function of an economic tort and protect economic interests."2 6 Should the
tort not continue to be constrained in this area and simply provide protec-
tion for the foreseeable infliction of economic harm, then clearly it could
undermine the limits of the established economic torts and force the courts
to consider what is appropriate competitive and economic practice (and
indeed to provide protection for reasonable expectations of economic ben-
efit).
B. The Action for Breach of Confidence and the Protection of Economic Interests
Though there is no property right in ideas or information as such, this ac-
tion provides useful control over information that the claimant has sought
to keep "under wraps" by granting protection against unauthorised use or
disclosure. The obligation to maintain confidentiality might arise from a
contractual relationship (such as employer/employee) but the obligation
can arise in a non-contractual setting. The juridical basis of this action has
been the subject of academic debate for some years, and indeed some
223 Commentators are divided on this issue. Compare Aidan Robertson & Audrey
Horton, Does the United Kingdom or the European Community Need an Unfair Competition Law? 17
E.I.P.R. 568 (1995), with the views of this writer.
224 Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562, 580 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Scot.)
(U.K).
225 Bob Hepple, Negligence: the Searchfor Coherence, in 50 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 69
(M.D.A. Freemon &A.D. Lewis eds., 1997).
226 Between 1979 and 1984, it appeared that foresight of harm was the only real limit on
the application of the tort, though policy considerations were acknowledged.
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judges refer to the action as a tort. However, the better view is that the
action is simply based on an equitable principle of good faith. For Lord
Denning, "the law on this subject... depends on the broad principle of
equity that he who has received information in confidence shall not take
unfair advantage of it.1
22 7
In recent years, there have been major developments in the action for
breach of confidence, an action that covers personal confidences, trade se-
crets, and commercially valuable information generally."' 8 Though the tra-
ditional view of this action's framework (based on a relationship between
the claimant and the initial recipient of the information) 9 has been grow-
ing, the need for a pre-existing relationship (out of which the obligation
to maintain confidentiality would emerge) has now been jettisoned. It has
become clear since the judgment of Lord Goff in Attorney-Generalv. Guard-
ian Newspapers, Ltd. (No. 2)130 that a duty of confidentiality can arise inde-
pendently of any such relationship. 31 Though occasionally the courts may
stress the wrongdoing of a defendant as the key to liability, in fact it has
become evident that the duty can arise from the defendant's knowledge
of the nature of the information itself. So Lord Nicholls in 2004231 sum-
marised the law of confidence as the imposition of "a 'duty of confidence'
whenever a person receives information he knows or ought to know is fairly
and reasonably to be regarded as confidential."
' 33
Clearly, this heralds a wider remit for the action, and appellate judges
have acknowledged that this action continues to develop "to reflect chang-
es in society, technology and business practice.""z But, just as importantly,
the courts have extended the type of "information" that is protected by
227 Thus, Weir, in his casebook on torts, stresses that tort law's protection of "neighbours"
is very different to its protection of competitors: "while the rules of negligence just give people
'out', as it were, like an umpire in a cricket match, these decisions [in economic tort litigation]
lay down the rules of the game, rules as a basis for action, determining what is permitted and
what is not." TONY WEIR, A CASEBOOK ON TORT, 573 (i oth ed. 2004).
228 Seager v. Copydex, Ltd. (No. i), [19671 FS.R. 2 11, 220 (CA (Civ. Div.).
229 It also covers state secrets. For the nineteenth century origins of the modern law, see
Prince Albertv. Strange, (1849) 2 De G. & Sm 652.
23o This view is summarised in the often-cited judgment of Megarry, J. in Coco vA.N.Clark
(Engineers), Ltd., [1968] ES.R. 415 (Ch. D.). The principles contained in this judgment have
repeatedly been approved and will continue to apply in the standard commercial secrets
case.
231 Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers, Ltd. (No. 2), (199o)1 A.C. io9.
232 See Attorney General v. Guardian Newspapers, Ltd. (No. 2), (1990) 1 A.C. io9 (H.L.)
Lord Goff gave as an example of potential liability under this action a party picking up an
obviously private diary, dropped in a public space and attempting to use or disclose the
contents. Id. at 332. Thus, although in some cases the courts highlight improper behaviour
on the part of the defendant, the duty of confidence arises from the nature of the information
itself.
233 See Campbell v. Mirror Group Newspapers, Ltd. (2004) 2 AC 457 (H.L.).
234 Id. at 465.
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this action. This is particularly important in the commercial setting (though
there have been separate developments in the area of personal confidences
where the courts appear to be edging towards some form of privacy right
or rights).,3s In recent years, the courts have allowed claimants to use the
action for breach of confidence where information in the traditional sense
(trade secrets, formulae, and customer lists) is not the issue but, rather, the
issue is the commercial exploitation of a valuable image. So, in Shelley Films,
Ltdv. Rex Features, Ltd236 and in Creation Records, Ltd. v. News Group Newspa-
pers, Ltd.,37 a commercially valuable image which the claimants had clearly
set to keep "under wraps" was held to be protectable under this action. 3
Both of these decisions (though first instance only) were cited by the Court
of Appeal in Douglas v. Hello! (No.6).139 Here, it will be recalled, both the
tort of unlawful interference with trade and the action for breach of confi-
dence were at issue. What the Court of Appeal recognised was that the ce-
lebrity couple were concerned both with the invasion of their privacy and
the commercial exploitation of the must-have images of their wedding. 4
Lord Phillips MR noted, "[wle can see no reason in principle why equity
should not protect the opportunity to profit from confidential information
about oneself in the same circumstances that it protects the opportunity
to profit from confidential information in the nature of a trade secret." '41
Of course, in essence the "information" here was the photographic image.
Presumably, the information as to what the bride wore, etc., could have
been relayed by any guest (or indeed sketched)., 4 So it is not so much the
information as the image that has been protected.
235 Douglas v. Hello! Ltd., [zoo] ES.R. 40, [165] (CA) (Keene LJ).
236 English common law does not, in theory, distinguish between the different categories
of information that the claimant may seek to protect against unauthorised use or disclosure, but
it is becoming apparent that the law is developing different strategies depending on whether
the information at issue is personal or commercial (but that is a whole different Article!).
237 See Shelley Films, Ltd. v. Rex Features, Ltd., [19941 E.M.L.R. 134 (Ch. D.). The
plaintiff in this case was a production company making a new Frankenstein film under
conditions of secrecy. In particular, they sought to keep secret the image of the leading
actor in the role of the monster until the release of the film. They successfully sought an
interim injunction on the basis that the defendant's surreptitious photograph of this valuable
marketing tool was in breach of confidence.
238 See Creation Records, Ltd. v. News Group Newspapers, Ltd., [1997] E.M.L.R. 444
(Ch. D.). In this case, the public was allowed to attend the photo shoot of the band's new
album cover, but people were not allowed to photograph it. The defendant's surreptitious
photograph was held to be taken in breach of confidence. Id. at 456.
239 Id.
24o Douglas v. Hello! (No.6), [zoo5] EWCA (Civ) 595 (CA (Civ. Div.)), 2005 4 All E.R.
iz8.As the number after the case reference indicates the dispute between the celebrity
couple/OK! Magazine and Hello! magazine has spawned a web of litigation.
241 Seeid. at [io9]-[Ii1].
242 Id. at [ 13]. The principle was stated thus "[w]here an individual ("the owner") has
at his disposal information which he has created or which is private or personal and to which
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Clearly, this is a cause of action with potential for those who seek wider
protection against "misappropriation" (though with the drawback that the
claimant must identify some secret or confidential matter). Indeed, this
potential within the action seemed to be at the heart of the majority view of
the House of Lords in the Hello! decision. By the time this action reached
the House of Lords, only the commercial claim for breach of confidence
brought by OK! against Hello! was in issue, the privacy aspects of that ac-
tion having been attached to the Douglases' claim, from which there was no
appeal. Though the House asserted that the action has not developed into
an "image or publicity" right-Lord Walker noting that "under English law
it is not possible for a celebrity to claim a monopoly in his or her image, as
if it were a trade mark or brand"2 43-in essence the majority", appeared
to allow OK! magazine a form of right over the photographic spectacle of
the celebrity wedding (something the Court of Appeal had not permitted).
Lords Hoffmann and Brown seemed to be influenced by the fact that OK!
had paid a lot of money for exclusivity, 4 ' which Hello! had intentionally
destroyed. Crucially, the majority of the House held that the benefit of con-
fidentiality encompassed not just the authorised photographs (which were
of course the heart of the exclusive deal) but in fact all the photographs
of the entire wedding as an event. Overall, these liberal interpretations of
the facts enabled the majority to impose an obligation of confidence in
favour of the exclusive licensee who had paid a great deal of money for his
scoop.
46
he can properly deny access to third parties, and he reasonably intends to profit commercially
by using or publishing that information, then a third party who is, or ought to be, aware of
these matters and who has knowingly obtained the information without authority, will be in
breach of duty if he uses or publishes the information to the detriment of the owner." Id. at
[11l].
243 In Creation Records, it was specifically accepted that anyone could have sketched the
scene: such a sketch would have had no commercial worth. It was the photographic image
that was marketable. Creation Records, Ltd., ['997] E.M.L.R. 444,455.
244 Id. at [293].
245 Lords Hoffmann, Brown, and Baroness Hale.
246 So Lord Hoffmann notes in Douglas v Hello!; Mainstream Properties v Young; OBG
v Allen, [20071 U.K.H.L. 21, 1171 that OK! had paid i million for the exclusive photographs
and he continues, the issue becomes simply keeping "one's eye firmly on the money and why
it was paid." In the next paragraph he states "OK! was willing to pay for the right..." and id.
at [Iol, "I see no reason why there should not be an obligation of confidence for the purpose
of enabling someone to be the only source of publication if that is something worth paying
for." Lord Brown asserted, id. at 1325], "having paid i m for an exclusive right it seems to me
that OK! ought to be in a position to protect that right and to look to the law for redress where
a third party intentionally destroys it."
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VII. CONCLUSION
In the trilogy of general economic tort cases, the House of Lords has pro-
vided some clarity to the framework of the general economic torts. But,
as has been shown, uncertainties remain.247 As for the tort of passing off,
though still limited in scope to cases of misrepresentation, it is clear that
there is some judicial sympathy for its de facto application in cases better
interpreted as involving misappropriation than misrepresentation. How-
ever, its future development remains unclear. These are interesting days
for anyone intrigued by this area of English common law. Baroness Hale
in fact commented that there would be much to be said for having a single
majority opinion as "there would be less grist to the advocates' and aca-
dem ics' m ills .... ,,48
247 Lord Walker (in the minority with Lord Nicholls) rejected this "misappropriation"
sentiment, noting that "the confidentiality of any information must depend on its nature, not
on its market value," id. at [2991. He concluded: "OK no more had a monopoly in any possible
photo of the spectacle than it had in the spectacle itself..., id. at [296].
248 Id. at 13031 (Baroness Hale).
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